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ABSTRACT 
 
 
SOVIET TRANSCAUCASUS 1917-1945: NATIONS IN TRANSITION  
 
Aksoy, Didem 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Dr. Hasan Ali KARASAR 
September 2013 
 
 
 
 
 This thesis analyzes the nationalities policy of the Soviet Union with a special 
emphasis on three major Transcaucasian nationalities, i.e. Georgians, Azerbaijanis 
and Armenians. The thesis focuses on the Soviet nationalities policy and attempts to 
shed light on the history of these three Transcaucasian nationalities within the 
context of this policy. Soviet nationalities policy, even if disparately applied for any 
nationality under the Soviet rule, resulted in significant consequences for all the 
nationalities of the Union. Within this framework, this study aims to explain both 
idiosyncratic and alike evolutions of Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians, at the 
same time, under the Soviet rule. Finally, it argues that Soviet policies, specifically 
the nationalities policy, played the major role in the transformation of 
Transcaucasian nationalities and determined the current dynamics of the region. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
SOVYET TRANSKAFKASYASI 1917-1945: ULUSLARIN DÖNÜŞÜMÜ 
 
 
Aksoy, Didem 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Hasan Ali KARASAR 
Eylül 2013 
 
 
 
 Bu tez, başlıca üç Transkafkasya milleti olan Gürcü, Azeri ve Ermenilere 
özellikle vurgu yaparak Sovyet milliyetler politikasını incelemektedir. Tez, Sovyet 
milliyetler politikasına odaklanarak üç Transkafkasya milletinin tarihine bu politika 
kapsamında ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktadır. Milletlere farklı şekillerde uygulanmış olsa 
dahi, Sovyet milliyetler politikası Sovyet yönetimi altındaki her millet için önemli 
sonuçlar doğurmuştur. Bu çerçevede, çalışma Sovyet yönetimi altındaki Gürcü, 
Azeri ve Ermenilerin aynı anda hem kendilerine özgü hem de birbirine benzer olan 
gelişimlerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Sonuç olarak, tez, Sovyet politikalarının, 
özellikle de milliyetler politikasının Transkafkasya milletlerinin dönüşümünde temel 
rol oynadığını ve bölgenin bugünkü dinamiklerini belirlediğini savunmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Sovyetler Birliği, Sovyet milliyetler politikası, Gürcistan, 
Azerbaycan, Ermenistan 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 Soviet nationalities policy has long been debated after the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. Nationalities policy, specifically conducted under Stalin’s rule, has 
been mostly criticized for what it resulted in. It is negotiable whether the Soviet 
ethnic, political, social, economic, linguistic and demographic engineering on the 
nationalities of the multi-ethnic Soviet state which was aimed at creating of a “Soviet 
man” is a sheer success story. However, it is indisputable that the Soviet nationalities 
policy has distinct reflections on the non-Russian nationalities of the Union. 
 
 First and foremost, it should be emphasized that there was not a unique and 
coherent nationalities policy under the Soviet rule. Setting aside that the main 
principles changed over time, the degree and the application of the practices 
differentiated from nation to nation. Therefore, the inconsistency in the application of 
the practices which on the one hand encouraged national development, and forced 
the creation of a culturally and ideologically unified centralized state on the other 
caused inevitable instabilities in the post-Soviet geography. 
 
2 
 
 Transcaucasus, as a homeland for considerable amount of different 
nationalities and a region which was shaped by invasions and migrations throughout 
the history, presents a good example to observe the reflections of the Soviet 
nationalities policy. Seventy years of Soviet rule and nationalities policy forced an 
irreversible radical change upon both the minority and majority nationalities of the 
region. The outcomes of socio-economic practices were coupled with the outcomes 
of the political preferences of the Soviet power, which re-drew the borders in the 
region, and determined the nation and state formations of the nationalities of the 
region. In this study, the major nationalities of the region, which every of them had 
their own idiosyncratic experience under the Soviet rule, is under scrutiny. 
 
 This thesis strives to analyze the transformation of the major Transcaucasian 
nationalities, i.e. Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians, first under the rule of the 
Russian Empire, secondly and essentially under the rule of the Soviet Union. 
Although there are plenty of studies in the literature examining the Soviet legacy in 
Transcaucasus, especially after the breakup of the Soviet Union, most of them focus 
on the certain aspects of this legacy. In an attempt to present a comprehensive 
understanding of the history along with the contemporary situation of the region, this 
thesis concentrates on social, economic and political aspects of the Soviet legacy, in 
wider sense. Therefore, a literature review of the sources written in English, Russian 
and Turkish languages on the history of the Transcaucasian nationalities have been 
used. 
  
 The second chapter begins with a short history of Transcaucasus which was a 
scene of rivalry among three empires during the 19
th
 century. For this purpose, the 
3 
 
establishment of the Tsarist rule over the region, the administrative structure of the 
era, and the further developments are analyzed. Moreover, since the nationalities 
question is of utmost importance as a focal point of this thesis, the nationalities issue 
in the Russian Empire is also examined. 
 
 The third chapter aims to scrutinize the earlier developments within 
Transcaucasia under the Soviet rule. Along with the administrative and political 
compositions of the Transcaucasian nationalities, the completion of the Bolshevik 
takeover of Transcaucasus is analyzed in this section.  
 
 The fourth chapter is the heart of this thesis. It focuses on the transition of the 
Soviet Transcaucasus until the end of the Second World War. Here, the roles played 
by the sociological realities of the region; namely the nationalities policy and the 
territorial arrangements are analyzed. The famous purges of the 1930s were also 
valid in the Transcaucasian republics, which also played a role in the final shaping of 
the region. This chapter ends with a brief analysis of the impacts of the Second 
World War on Transcaucasus. At the end of which the region has taken its final 
shape reflected itself after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Needless to 
say, this final shape has also contained several problems concerning national 
identities and borders which are centers of conflict resolution efforts in our age.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
GEORGIA, ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN UNDER THE 
TSARIST RULE (1905-1917) 
 
 
 
 In the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire continuously had expanded its 
possessions between the Caspian and the Black Seas, and in some regions its 
frontiers had reached to the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains.
1
 By the last quarter 
of the eighteenth century, Transcaucasus region was to become a buffer zone 
between the three competing empires: the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and 
the Qajar Empire. When Empress Catherine the Great (r.1762-1796) expanded the 
territories of the Russian Empire to the northern shores of the Black Sea during her 
reign, the Empire also had an aim of expanding its territories to the Transcaucasus 
region. At the end of the 18th century, the Qajar Empire, supported by Great Britain 
and France, tried to seize Georgia in an invasion by the Emperor Aga Muhammad 
Khan (r.1794-1797).
2
 Committed with the 1783 Treaty of Georgievsk,
3
 which had 
                                                          
1
Theodore R. Weeks, "Managing Empire: Tsarist Nationalities Policy," In Dominic Lieven, ed., The 
Cambridge History of Russia: Imperial Russia, 1689-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 36.  
2
 "Persidskiy Pokhod 1796," In Alexander Mikhaylovich Prokhorov, ed., Bol'shaia Sovetskaia 
Entsiklopediia, Vol 19, 1305 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel'stvo, 1975), p. 1305.; 
"Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Evgenii Mikhailovich Zhukov, ed., Sovetskaia istoricheskaia 
entsiklopediia, Vol 12, 360-365 (Moskva: Otdelenie istorii akademii nauk sssr, 1961), p. 361. 
5 
 
put Georgian Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti under the Russian protectorate,
4
 Empress 
Catherine the Great initiated the Persian Campaign and sent Russian troops to the 
assistance of King Erekle II of Georgia against the Qajars in April 1796. In 
November, Russian troops reached confluence of Kura and Aras rivers. However, 
when Empress Catherine the Great died, the new Emperor Paul I (r. 1796-1801) 
recalled the expedition before achieving any decisive results. Finally, in December 
1796, Russian troops were totally withdrawn from Transcaucasus.
5
  
 
 Due to the continuing pressures from the Qajar Empire on Georgia, the new 
King George XII decided to incorporate Georgia into the Russian Empire after King 
Erekle II’s death in 1798. In return, he wanted to be sure that the Russian Emperor 
would grant his dynasty the right to rule Georgia. Paul I agreed during the 1799 
negotiations in St. Petersburg. However, the deaths of Paul I and George XII 
intermitted the process. The new Emperor Alexander I (r. 1801-1825) issued a 
manifesto on confirming the annexation of Georgia into the Russian Empire on 12 
December 1801.
6
 After this annexation, Alexander I sought to expand Russian 
influence to Dagestan and Azerbaijan.
7
 In 1803 Samegrelo, in 1804 Imereti and 
Guria were annexed by the Russian Empire. In 1804, the Russian armies under the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
3
 According to this treaty, the Georgian King Erekle II recognized the Russian Empire as his protector 
and relinquished any independent foreign policy. He also obligated his troops to serve the Russian 
empress. For her part, Catherine II pledged to preserve the integrity of Erekle’s possessions. Georgia 
was given complete internal autonomy. The treaty also granted rights to the privileged Georgian 
monarchy and upheld its authority. See: "Georgievskiy Traktat 1783," In Alexander Mikhaylovich 
Prokhorov, ed., Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol 6, 941-942 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
nauchnoe izdatel'stvo, 1971); For the full text of the Treaty in Russian see: "Dogovor O Priznanii 
Carem Kartalinskim I Kahetinskim Irakliem Ii Pokrovitel'stva I Verhovnoj Vlasti Rossii (Georgievskiy 
Traktat)."  http://www.istoria.ge/Documents/1783%20georgievskis%20traqtati.htm. 
4
 "Georgievskiy Traktat 1783," In Prokhorov, p. 942; Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire: 
1801-1917 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 61.; Paul Crego, "Georgia and Georgians," In 
J.R. Millar, ed., Encyclopedia of Russian History (New York: Macmillan, 2004), p. 550. 
5
 "Persidskiy Pokhod 1796," In Prokhorov, p. 1305.; Seton-Watson, p. 61. 
6
 Seton-Watson, pp. 61-62. 
7
 "Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Zhukov, p. 361. 
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command of General Tsitsianov captured Gence Khanate.
8
 This occupation was the 
major cause of the Russo-Qajar War of 1804-1813.
9
  
 
 Russian expansion in Transcaucasus caused great concern in the Qajar 
Empire. In May 1804, the Qajar Empire demanded the immediate withdrawal of 
Russian troops from the Caucasus in the form of an ultimatum. However, since the 
Russian Empire did not accept the ultimatum, clashes between the two empires 
began in June 1804. Although there were several times more Qajar soldiers on the 
ground than Russian soldiers, they were in poor condition in terms of training and 
organization. The main fighting took place on the both sides of Lake Sevan in two 
directions: Erivan and Gence.
10
 In November 1805, Tsitsianov advanced to Baku, but 
in February 1806 he was assassinated during negotiations with the Khan of Baku at 
the Baku fortress. General I. V. Gudovich was appointed as the commander in 
chief.
11
 In the summer of 1806 the army of Shah Abbas-Mirza (r. 1797-1833), the 
successor of Aga Muhammad Khan, was defeated at Karabakh, and Russian troops 
occupied Nukha, Derbent, Baku, and Kuba.
12
  
 
 With the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–1812, the Russians 
concluded a temporary truce with the Qajars in the winter of 1806. However, the 
peace negotiations were unsuccessful, and military actions re-started in September 
1808.
13
 Simultaneously, the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 resulted with the 
victory of the Russians, and the Ottoman Empire had renounced its claims on most of 
                                                          
8
 "Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Alexander Mikhaylovich Prokhorov, ed., Bol'shaia Sovetskaia 
Entsiklopediia, Vol 22, 1232-1234 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel'stvo, 1975), p. 1233. 
9
 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 308. 
10
 " Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Prokhorov, p. 1233. 
11
 "Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Zhukov, p. 362. 
12
 " Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Prokhorov, p. 1233. 
13
 "Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Zhukov, pp. 362-363. 
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the western Georgia with the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812.
14
 The Qajars were also 
defeated by the Russians, and were forced to sign the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813.
15
 
With this treaty, the Qajar Empire recognized the annexation of Dagestan and parts 
of Azerbaijan by the Russian Empire.
16
 Also, the local khans were reduced to the 
status of vassals by this treaty.
17
 
 
 Although the Russian supremacy over the region was galvanized by these two 
treaties, Russo-Qajar hostility in Transcaucasus continued. In 1825, the Russians 
desired to widen their territories to the region of Gokcha which was refused by Shah 
Abbas Mirza, who “still cherished the hope of recovering Georgia and Azerbaijan.”18 
The troops of the Shah crossed the Aras River
19
 and launched a new war in 
Transcaucasus in the summer of 1826. At first, the Qajar troops were successful 
since General Yermolov was slow to response. The Russians lost Gence and were 
able to save only Tiflis. However, in the autumn of 1826, Russian troops under the 
command of General I.F. Paskevich launched a counter-attack and carried the war 
into the Qajar territory. Within few months, the Russians captured Erivan and 
Tebriz.
20
 The Qajar Empire was forced to sign the Treaty of Turkmenchai in 1828.
21
 
                                                          
14
 "Bukharestskiy Mirnyy Dogovor 1812," In Alexander Mikhaylovich Prokhorov, ed., Bol'shaia 
Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol 4, 480 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel'stvo, 1971), p. 
480.; For a detailed account of the Treaty of Bucharest see: F. Ismail, "The Making of the Treaty of 
Bucharest, 1811-1812," Middle Eastern Studies (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1979). 
15
 For a detailed account of Treaty of Gulistan see: Muriel Atkin, Russia and Iran 1780-1828 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1980). Also, for the full text of the treaty in Russian see: 
“Mirnny Traktat Zaklyuchennyy Mezhdu Rossiyey I Persiyey”. 
http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/ruper1813.html. 
16
 "Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Prokhorov, p. 1233.; "Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Zhukov, 
p. 363.;Riasanovsky, p. 308. 
17
 Robert F. Baumann, "Russo-Persian Wars," In J.R. Millar, ed., Encyclopedia of Russian History 
(New York: Macmillan, 2004), p. 1336.  
18
 Seton-Watson, p. 289. 
19
 "Russko-Iranskie Voyny 19 v.," In Prokhorov, p. 1234. 
20
 Seton-Watson, p. 289. 
21
 For the full text of the treaty in Russian see: “O mire mezhdu Rossiey i Persiey ili Turkmanchayskiy 
mirnyy dogovor”. http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/ruper1828.html. 
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By this treaty, the Russian Empire acquired Nakhichevan and Erivan Khanates.
22
 
Also, the border between the Qajar and the Russian Empires was demarcated by the 
Treaty of Turkmenchai as the Aras River.
23
 
 
 The last treaty that enabled the Russian Empire to gain the control of whole 
Transcaucasus was the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople, signed with the Ottoman Empire 
after the 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish War.
24
 With this treaty, the Ottoman Empire 
recognized the Russian annexation of Georgia, Imereti, Samegrelo and Guria, as well 
as the Khanates of Erivan and Nakhichevan.
25
 Finally, Transcaucasus became an 
integral part of the Russian Empire.  
 
 
2.1 Transcaucasus Coming under the Tsarist Rule 
 
 Transcaucasus region, which previously had been a matter of competition 
between the three empires, became a geographical entity under one single rule by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. After the integration of Transcaucasus into the 
Russian Empire, the colonization process of the region began.
26
 The Empire deemed 
its role in the region as a civilizing mission. Therefore, throughout the nineteenth 
                                                          
22
 "Turkmanchayskiy Dogovor 1828," In Alexander Mikhaylovich Prokhorov, ed., Bol'shaia 
Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol 26, 1009 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel'stvo, 1977), p. 
1009. 
23
 Seton-Watson, p. 290. 
24
 For a detailed account of the treaty see: Şerafettin Turan, "1829 Edirne Antlaşması," A.Ü. DTCF 
Dergisi (Vol. 9, No. 1-2, 1951). 
25
 "Adrianopol'skiy Mirnyy Dogovor 1829," In Alexander Mikhaylovich Prokhorov, ed., Bol'shaia 
Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Vol 1, 687 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel'stvo, 1970), p. 
687. 
26
 For a detailed account of the Russian Empire’s colonialism see: Michael Rywkin, ed., Russian 
Colonial Expansion to 1917 (London: Mansell Publishing, 1988) and James Gibson, "Russian 
Imperial Expansion in Context and by Contrast," Journal of Historical Geography (Vol. 2, No. 28, 
2002). 
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century, while taking the advantage of the vast resources of the region, the Empire 
played an important role in the evolution and development of Transcaucasus. 
 
 The Tsarist administration brought industry and education facilities to 
Transcaucasian nations. A large lumber industry was established in Georgian regions 
in order to make efficient use of its forests. After the discovery of oil in Baku, the 
Russians were quick to benefit from this source. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, Baku was the fastest-growing industrial city of the Empire, which witnessed 
the emergence of new classes: trading, working, and intellectual. The Empire 
educated the Armenian people with a Russo-European culture. In the final analysis, 
the integration of the region into the Russian Empire determined the social, 
economic, and political future of Transcaucasus. 
 
 
 
2.1.1 Tsarist Administration in Transcaucasus 
 
 
 As a result of successive victorious wars with the Qajar and the Ottoman 
Empires, the Russian Empire widened its external borders to the Ararat Valley and 
Turkey (Akhaltsikhe Pashalik) in the years 1828 and 1829. The territorial 
reorganization of Transcaucasus region was later determined by the periodic changes 
in the general administrative policies. The Polish Uprising of 1831 resulted with the 
centralization of administration since it showed the vulnerability of Tsarist rule in the 
potentially autonomous peripheral provinces. Therefore, the territorial organization 
of the region was settled in accordance with the government’s centralist policies. 
10 
 
Towards 1840, the territory of Transcaucasus was divided into two administrative 
units: Georgian-Imereti guberniya
27
 and the Caspian oblast
28
.
29
 
 
 In 1844 the Viceroyalty of Caucasus was established in the North Caucasus 
and in Transcaucasus with its center in Tiflis. The viceroy was directly reporting to 
the Russian Emperor.
30
 With the ongoing changes in territorial organizations, seven 
administrative divisions were established in Transcaucasus during the second half of 
the nineteenth century under the Viceroyalty of Caucasus: Baku guberniya (est. in 
1846), Tiflis guberniya (est. in 1846), Kutaisi guberniya (est. in 1846), Erivan 
guberniya (est. in 1849), Yelisavetpol [Gence] guberniya (est. in 1868), Batumi 
oblast (est. in 1878), and Kars oblast (est. in 1878).
31
 
 
 The full integration of the region to the Empire was notably provided with the 
administrative reforms of 1860s and 1870s. These reforms had considerable long-
term social, political and economic consequences for the region. After Emperor 
Alexander II (r.1855-1881) abolished the serfdom in the territories of the Empire in 
1861, the landless peasants moved to towns in search of jobs. A number of 
Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians went to study in Russia and brought new 
liberal ideas to their homes on their return, which would influence the political 
movements in the region. As a result, these migration waves paved the way for the 
                                                          
27
 The word guberniya is usually translated as province. 
28
 The word oblast is usually translated as region. 
29
 A.A. Cuciev, "Atlas Etnopoliticheskoy Istorii Kavkaza." Proekt po istorii i kul'ture Osetii i osetin 
Osetiny i Osetiya.  Iriston, 6 June 2009. <http://www.iriston.com/books/cuciev_-
_etno_atlas/cuciev_etno-polit_map.htm>. 
30
 Vladimir Bobrovnikov, "Islam in the Russian Empire," In Dominic Lieven, ed., The Cambridge 
History of Russia: Imperial Russia, 1689-1917 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 
215. 
31
 Sergey Tarkhov, "Izmenenie Administrativno Territorial'nogo Deleniya Rossii V Xiii—Xx Vv.," 
Logos (Vol. 1, No. 46, 2005), p. 69.; Frederik Coene, The Caucasus: An Introduction (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), p. 129.; Cuciev. 
11 
 
creation of an intellectual class in the region which would be effective before and 
after the 1905 revolution.
32
 
 
 In the reign of the Emperor Alexander III (r. 1881-1894) Transcaucasus went 
under a dramatic change. The new Emperor desired to create unity in the empire via 
centralization of the administration of the non-Russian parts of the Empire.
33
 
Therefore, the Viceroyalty of Caucasus was abolished in 1882 and replaced by a 
local governor-generalship.
34
 Apart from centralization policies, another objective of 
Alexander III was Russification. He was often considered as the “first nationalist on 
the Russian throne.”35 During his reign, Russification was extended to the peoples of 
Transcaucasus.
36
 Cultural absorption was one of the main pillars of this policy. 
Therefore, systematic elimination of the natives from the local administrations and 
the elimination of the native language instruction in the schools were the two 
processes adopted by the Russian administration in Transcaucasus.
37
  The attempts of 
the imperial authorities to speed up Russification of the multi-ethnic Transcaucasian 
population were followed by an extension of discriminatory practices. However, 
these policies caused a counter effect and provoked the rise of nationalist 
consciousness among the local intellectual elite.
38
 Consequently, this attempt for 
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Russification resulted with the consolidation of local elites, reminded them their 
ethnic roots.
39
 
 
 By the 1905 Revolution, an increasing polarization of political forces was to 
play an important role in the region. Due to this polarization, social and ethnic 
problems of the region could not have been accurately addressed by the authorities. 
Provoked by the government during the course of the 1890s, the politicization and 
radicalization of ethnic elites increased substantially to an extent that could not be 
safely neutralized. The social, economic and national contradictions in the region 
were paired with a tendency toward the attainment of a regional self-government.
40
 
Yet, until 1914, these political movements were not separatist movements in their 
nature.
41
 The structures, ideologies and policies of these movements will be analyzed 
in detail in the following sections. 
 
 
2.1.2 1905 Revolution and the Peoples of Transcaucasus 
 
 
 The evolution of Transcaucasus under the Tsarist rule notably affected the 
conditions and the peoples of the region on the eve of 1905 Revolution. Therefore, it 
would be beneficial first to draw a sketch of the evolution of Transcaucasus under 
the Tsarist rule.  
 
 The Tsarist occupation of Transcaucasus played an important role on the 
sociological transformation of the region, especially when we focus on the 1905 
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Revolution.
42
 Three processes were effective in the shaping of the region; the 
imposition of the tsarist rule, the rise of a market economy, and the emergence of 
national intelligentsias. These processes also determined the intensification of 
political and national consciousness among the ethnic and religious communities of 
Transcaucasus.
43
  
 
 The Tsarist regime fostered commerce, industry, and education in the region 
in accordance with its colonial policy. Therefore, Transcaucasus region was 
relatively peaceful and secure by the end of the nineteenth century.
44
 Despite this 
development, some problems relating with the changing dynamics of the region 
emerged by the end of the nineteenth century. In Georgia, traditional Georgian 
nobility was challenged as a result of the emancipation of the serfs and the increasing 
power of the urban middle class, which was largely composed of Armenians.
45
 The 
Armenians gained greater economic power in Georgia.
46
 In 1900, 44% of the largest 
industrial establishments in Georgia belonged to the Armenians, while only 10% was 
owned by the Georgians.
47
 The situation in Azerbaijan was similar. The Azerbaijani 
people were under the pressure of a strong Armenian bourgeoisie. The Armenians 
were dominant in both the Baku’s vital oil industry and the trade circles.48 For the 
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Armenians, the problems were not mainly economic as in the cases of Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. The confiscation of the Armenian Church properties in 1903 by the 
Russian Empire was the major problem which caused resentment among the 
Armenians of the Empire.
49
 
 
 The 1905 Revolution shook the foundations of the autocratic regime and 
created the preconditions for the subsequent struggle for the overthrow of the tsarist 
regime. The revolution against the autocratic regime became a stimulus for the 
oppressed non-Russian nationalities of the Empire.
50
 The 1905 Revolution created an 
environment of chaos in Transcaucasus. There were waves of peasant uprisings, 
strikes by railway workers, office workers, artisans, and students. The authorities 
were inefficient in dealing with the situation in the region until the end of 1907. 
These uprisings of Transcaucasian nationalities became more complex by the 
conflicts among the three nationalities due to the abovementioned problems 
originating from the social changes in the region.
51
 
 
 As a result of the 1905 Revolution, the Russian Empire became a semi-
constitutional monarchy, where the half-elected Senate was the upper house of the 
parliamentary system, while the Duma made up the lower house.
52
 The Russian 
“center–regions” system became more complex with the establishment of the State 
Duma, which was the first all-imperial representative institution, in 1906. New 
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parliamentarism enabled the representatives of regions and peoples to take place in 
an elected institution and to express their national and regional interests from an 
official platform in the Empire. However, since the autocratic government opposed 
to decentralization, the Duma was not allowed to change the political and 
administrative system of relations between the center and the regions.
53
  
 
 The national representation of the peoples of Transcaucasus in the State 
Dumas between 1906 and 1917 was dependent upon the density, the social and the 
national-religious composition of the population. The Georgians were represented in 
the Dumas as following: seven deputies in the first and second, two deputies in the 
third, and three deputies in the fourth Dumas. The number of deputies of the 
Azerbaijanis decreased regularly in the course of the elections. They were 
represented by six deputies in the first, five deputies in the second and one deputy in 
the third and fourth Dumas. The representation of the Armenians was more of a 
stable one: five deputies in the first, seven deputies in the second, and four deputies 
in the third and fourth Dumas.
54
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Table 1. Representation of Transcaucasian Peoples in the State Dumas 
 First Duma 
(April 27 - 
July 8, 1906) 
Second Duma 
(February 20 - 
June 2, 1907) 
Third Duma 
(November 1, 
1907-June 9, 
1912) 
Fourth Duma 
(November 15, 
1912-October 
6, 1917) 
Georgians 7 7 2 3 
Azerbaijanis 6 5 1 1 
Armenians 5 7 4 4 
  
 Although the State Duma was a weak democratic formation and there were 
relatively low number of deputies from the three Transcaucasian nationalities, the 
Dumas played a significant role in the formation of national political elites in 
Transcaucasus. They have “aided the growth of the political culture of society and 
the development of regional and national self-consciousness, and favored the 
diffusion of democratic ideas of national self-determination.”55 The aforementioned 
problems of Transcaucasian nationalities, hand in hand with the effects of 1905 
revolution, had significant consequences in terms of national awakening in 
Transcaucasus.
56
 Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani intellectuals began to 
advocate nationalism and socialism, and started to support revolutionary fractions by 
the beginning of the twentieth century.  
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2.1.3  Russian Empire and Transcaucasian Nationalities 
 
 
 Russia has always been a multinational Empire. However, the concepts of 
nation and nationality were not parts of the political system of the Russian Empire to 
a great extent until the later nineteenth century.
57
 Before the nineteenth century, 
religion was the dominant factor determining the concepts of nation and nationality. 
In this context, Russian culture and Russian Orthodox religion were the predominant 
characteristics of the Tsarist regime, which was not in favor of diversity. Therefore, 
the Tsarist regime did not adopt an explicit nationalities policy before the end of the 
nineteenth century. The regime was more concerned with the order of newly 
conquered lands and collection of taxes than dealing with the non-Russian 
nationalities of the Empire. In the aftermath of the Polish uprising of January 1863, a 
nationalities policy emerged in the Empire, solely focusing on the Polish problem.
58
 
After the uprising, the Tsarist regime tried to foster the Russian military and 
administration in its non-Russian regions. To be described as Russification later, this 
policy helped strengthening cultural and administrative centralization of the Empire. 
Yet, an official Russification policy was not adopted in Transcaucasus until the end 
of the nineteenth century.
59
  
 
 The 1905 revolution unraveled a civil unrest among the minorities of the 
Empire. Relative liberal attitude of the tsarist regime towards the non-Russian 
peoples starting with the establishment of the State Duma was reversed by 1907, and 
the policy of the regime became more pro-Russian and nationalistic.
60
 The 
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government changed the electoral laws in favor of the upper Russian classes, 
“depriving the remainder of the population of a proportionate voice in the legislative 
institutions of the state.”61 As a result, nationalism in both cultural and political 
spheres became more visible among the non-Russian peoples of the Empire in the 
post-1907 period. This helped the Transcaucasian peoples to build a national identity 
in due time.
62
  
 
 The national movements among the non-Russian peoples of the Russian 
Empire were affected by the same forces, which also became influential on the 
Russian society in the nineteenth century: romantic idealism including the notion of 
narod (people, nation) and the historic traditions, populism including the idealization 
of the peasantry, and socialism.
63
 In parallel with these lines, three associated 
processes paved the way for the transformation of the peoples of Transcaucasus into 
politically conscious and mobilized nationalities. The creation of a single legal order 
in Transcaucasus, development of commerce and industry, imposition of 
bureaucratic absolutism on loose political structures of Transcaucasus have 
undermined the local elites and brought about resistance movements of gentry and 
peasants. Consequently, the educated classes of Transcaucasians were pulled apart 
between the advantages and disadvantages of the autocratic Tsarist regime and some 
became pro-Tsarist, while the others headed for the revolutionary movements.
64
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 The development of three Transcaucasian national identities occurred at 
different rates and in different ways depending on their social, economic and political 
structures.
65
 In terms of urbanization level, the Armenians were the most urban while 
the Azerbaijanis were the least. The population densities were different as well. The 
Georgians and the Azerbaijanis lived in more compact territories while the Armenian 
settlements were scattered. Different classes were dominant in three societies: 
national nobility in Georgia, landed-mirzas
66
 and clergy in Azerbaijan, and merchant 
middle class in Armenia. Originating from all these differences, the characteristics of 
the national movements among the three societies were distinct. In Georgia, Marxism 
was the predominant ideology rather than nationalism, while Islamic reference and 
nationalism were stronger in Azerbaijan. Lastly, there was a stronger nationalist 
tendency in Armenia which dominated socialism.
67
 
 
 At the end of the nineteenth century, Georgia witnessed a conflicting process 
of social formation.
68
 On the one hand, the Georgians were becoming a part of the 
industrialized, urban and economically developed life. On the other hand, the 
disappearance of traditional feudal society, decline of the nobility, the incorporation 
of new market economy, the rise of the Armenian bourgeoisie, and the isolation of 
lower-class Georgians contributed to the creation of “the nationalist ideal of a unified 
and harmonious” Georgian “social order without class conflict.”69 With this ideal in 
mind, Russian educated intellectuals of Georgia adopted a Marxist political view 
preaching democratic socialism.
70
 This political view was excluding the Armenians 
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and the Russians from the society as they were the representatives of bourgeoisie and 
autocracy. The main supporters of Georgian Social Democrats were the workers. In 
1895, Marxists had taken over the journal Kvali (Trace) and became the most 
significant intellectual movement among the Georgians.
71
 By 1905, they gained 
extensive support from the peasantry as well. In the process, Georgian Marxist 
intellectuals, who were leading a national liberation movement, joined their forces 
with the Russian Social Democratic Party, the Mensheviks, and won the elections of 
the State Dumas from 1906 to 1912.
72
 Georgian Mensheviks even adopted a formula 
in 1910 aiming to gain extraterritorial cultural autonomy for Georgia.
73
  
 
 In Azerbaijan, the favored status of the Armenians by the Russians caused 
resentment among the Azerbaijanis who were suffering from the poor socio-
economic conditions. “Ethnic and religious differences, enhanced by feelings of 
inferiority and superiority,”74 between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis elicited a 
political awakening among the Azerbaijanis by the supplementary effects of 1905 
revolution.
75
 These differences between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis were 
also the bases of the enduring clashes between the two nations. The decade preceding 
the 1905 revolution laid the foundations of three ideologies that would construct the 
future of Azerbaijani political life: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism and liberalism.
76
 
1905 revolution also revealed the clashes between the Armenians and the 
Azerbaijanis. In 1905, Tatar
77
-Armenian conflicts spread from Baku to Nakhichevan. 
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Approximately ten thousand people were killed, and cities, towns, and villages were 
destroyed. The main fighting force of the Armenians was formed by the members of 
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun). In response, the Azerbaijanis 
founded a political association named Difai (Defense)
78
 in 1905 as the first “proto-
nationalist” Azerbaijani organization against the Russian rule.79  
 
 By 1905, a substantial number of Azerbaijanis embraced the slogan of 
‘Turkify, Islamize, Modernize’.80 Azerbaijani sense of self was consisting of the 
perception of threat from the Armenians as a privileged group living among 
themselves and a sense of connection to other Muslims, particularly Turks.
81
 Despite 
this Turkic and Islamic sense of self, the new Azerbaijani national identity was 
defined as Turkic but separate from Turkey, Shiite Islamic but detached from the 
clerical establishment.
82
 In the following process, Azerbaijani liberals became active 
in All-Muslim Russian Congresses of 1905 and 1906,
83
 and Baku based Muslim 
Constitutional Party, affiliated with the Kadets, was established in 1905. When the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) founded the constitutional regime in 
Turkey in 1908, the ideas of Pan-Turkism were strengthened in Azerbaijan.
84
 The 
main Azerbaijani nationalist party Musavat (Equality), which was based on the 
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ideology of democratic Turkism,
85
 was founded in 1911 in Baku as a result of 
Mehmet Emin Resulzade’s efforts.86 Musavat would be the sole political force in 
Azerbaijan by 1917.
87
  
 
 The main problem for the Armenians in the Empire was the autocratic regime 
which repressed the Armenian nation. Moreover, an intellectual awakening 
influenced by Western ideas, “a new interest in Armenian history and an increase in 
social interaction created a sense of secular nationality among many Armenians.”88 
The Armenian movement, which was mainly composed of middle and lower middle 
classes, gained a conspirational and para-military character by the end of the 
nineteenth century. It was less socialist in nature compared to the Georgian national 
movement.
89
 In the last decade of the nineteenth century, two Armenian 
revolutionary movements were founded: socialist Hunchak (Clarion) in 1887 in 
Geneva and Dashnaktsutyun in 1890 in Tiflis. Dashnaktsutyun was established by 
some of the detached members of Hunchak.
90
  
 
 In the process, radical nationalist Dashnaks outperformed the socialist 
Hunchaks and became more influential in politics. Dashnaktsutyun adopted 
revolutionary plans against both the Russian and the Ottoman rules. When the 
government expropriated the Armenian Church properties in 1903, the Dashnaks 
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organized a resistance and gained wide support from the peasantry.
91
 By 1905, they 
already adopted terror tactics and assassinated many Tsarist officers.
92
 The 
revolutionary struggles and the party struggles during the election campaigns for the 
State Dumas strengthened the Dashnaktsutyun which would be politically active both 
during the years of Russian Revolutions and later in Soviet Armenia.
93
 
 
 Apart from being influential on the political fates of three nationalities of 
Transcaucasus, “the differences in their economic statuses perpetuated and 
accentuated barriers of culture, religion and language.”94 Consequently, the divergent 
political development of the Georgians, the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians 
aggravated national rivalries
95
 and became more apparent with the outbreak of the 
First World War.  
 
 The First World War paved the way for a profound transformation in the 
dynamics of the region. Becoming one of the most important stages of the war, 
Transcaucasian countries experienced both unification and separation during the 
course of the war. The political heritage that the Transcaucasian peoples have 
developed since the end of the nineteenth century was a decisive factor that 
determined this process. Principally, the war was multi-dimensional for the peoples 
of the Transcaucasus who, time to time, struggled with each other, with the Great 
Powers and finally with the Bolsheviks. As a result, socio-economic and political 
conditions have irreversibly changed in the region. The Bolshevik takeover after the 
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end of the war, which would endure for seventy years, contributed to these changes 
along with playing a key role in destining the future of the region.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER IN 
TRANSCAUCASUS (1914-1921) 
 
 
 
 Russia’s control over Transcaucasus was mitigated when the First World War 
broke out in 1914. In 1917, the Russian Empire was entirely demolished as a result 
of the internal problems which had been compounded by the effects of the war. By 
the time the Tsar abdicated his throne after the February 1917 Revolution, to be 
succeeded by the Provisional Government, the traditional political authority in the 
borders of the Empire collapsed.
96
 As a result, from February 1917 on, 
Transcaucasus became free of Russian rule, but remained without any effective 
government. In the process, the Transcaucasian countries established the 
Transcaucasian Federative Republic, and then separated as independent republics. 
The enduring chaos in the region led to civil wars and invasions which lasted until 
the victory of the Bolshevik led Red Army in 1921. 
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3.1 Transcaucasus during the First World War (1914-1917) 
 
 
 The First World War emerged as a result of the ongoing economic, political 
and military problems in Europe since the 19
th
 century. The disturbances among the 
European states were unraveled by the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of 
Austria-Hungary by a Serbian nationalist on June 28, 1914.
97
 Due to ineffective 
diplomatic initiatives, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914 and 
the First World War broke out on the same day. On July 30, Tsar Nicholas II ordered 
General Suchomlinov to initiate general mobilization in Russia.
98
 Thereupon, 
Germany declared war on Russian Empire on August 1,
99
 and the war between 
Russia and Germany started. The war was an opportunity for the Russian Empire to 
have the chance to dominate Eastern Europe via protecting the Slavic people in the 
region and to have the control of the Straits.
100
 Russia, therefore, joined the war 
along with the Allied Powers. 
 
Transcaucasus became an important front in the war after the Ottoman 
Empire joined to the Central Powers in late October 1914.
101
 Internal tensions that 
were enduring since the end of the nineteenth century in the region were worsened 
with the outbreak of the war. Transcaucasus inevitably was “destined to be a pawn in 
a game played” by the great powers.102  
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The nations of Transcaucasus had divergent views on the war. Georgian 
socialists considered whether to declare support for the Germans while the 
Azerbaijanis were unwilling to be at war against the Turks. On the other hand, the 
Armenians were ready to fight in order to have a chance to “liberate their brethren 
from the Ottoman rule.”103 
 
 While the Russian Empire was suffering from devastating defeats against the 
Germans on the western front,
104
 it also waged war against the Ottoman Empire in 
the south,
105
 where the Russian Caucasian Army entered into the Ottoman 
territory.
106
 The Ottoman Third Army led by Enver Paşa initiated the Caucasus 
campaign with a call for jihad in December 1914,
107
 aiming to reach Baku in order to 
capture the oilfields and then to move into Central Asia and Afghanistan in order to 
establish a Turanic empire. The first battle between the Russian Caucasian Army 
under the command of General Vorontsov-Dashkov and the Ottoman Third Army 
was the Battle of Sarıkamış.108 The battle started on December 22, 1914 with the 
Turkish offensive. The Russian Caucasian Army overwhelmingly defeated the Third 
Army, who suffered from exhaustion and cold weather,
109
 and reestablished its 
position by January 17, 1915.
110
 The Turks had to retreat back to Erzurum.
111
 Well-
prepared Russian forces launched a new attack in Eastern Anatolia under the 
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command of General Yudenich by the start of 1916, defeated the Ottoman forces, 
and gained the control over some parts of the southern Black Sea coast, including 
Erzurum, Erzincan, and Trabzon.
112
 Although the Grand Duke Nikolas Nikolaevich 
was ready for a major offensive at the beginning of 1917, the February Revolution 
changed the plans. Soon, the Russian army fell apart.
113
 In January 1918, the 
Ottoman army launched a campaign to exploit this sudden weakness in the Russian 
armed forces in order to help Azerbaijani brethren in Gence and Baku. 
 
 
3.2 Transcaucasus during the Civil War (1917-1921) 
 
 
 During 1916 and 1917, Transcaucasus was under the authority of the Grand 
Duke Nikolas Nikolaevich who led military campaigns against the Turks.
114
 When 
the Tsar abdicated his throne, Nikolaevich resigned and yielded his civil authority to 
the Special Transcaucasian Committee (Osobyi Zakavkazskii Komitet-OZAKOM) 
which was the regional authority of the Provisional government.
115
 The committee 
“exercised little authority and limited itself during its existence to the introduction of 
organs of local self-rule (zemstva) into Transcaucasia.”116 Therefore, a diverse 
collection of socialist and nationalist parties and workers’ soviets were wielding the 
real power in Transcaucasus by 1917.
117
 Particularly, the two socialist-dominated 
soviets which were located in Tiflis and Baku were the preponderant political power 
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in Transcaucasus.
118
 Noe Zhordania’s Mensheviks were strong in the Tiflis soviet,119 
while there was a division of power between the Social Revolutionaries, the 
Mensheviks, the Musavatists, and the Dashnaks in the Baku soviet until 1918, when 
it started to incline to the left.
120
  
 
 The postures and programs of the political parties of the three nationalities 
were different from each other since these nationalities had experienced different 
courses of development during the previous decades.
121
 Among the other political 
parties of Transcaucasus, the Georgian Mensheviks were more interested in the 
participation in the Russian political life rather than focusing on local aims. After the 
February Revolution, they attained important positions in the politics of Russia, such 
as the ones in the Petrograd Soviet.
122
 Considering the close connection of the 
Georgian Mensheviks with the all-Russian socialist politics, Georgian Social 
Democratic Party was not a national party until 1918. Accordingly, it neither pursued 
specific demands for the Georgian people nor undertook a Georgian attitude towards 
the regional problems.
123
  
 
 The outbreak of the First World War had put the Azerbaijani political leaders 
in a troublesome situation. Russia’s war with the Ottoman Empire, with which the 
Musavatists shared their common pro-Turkish tendencies, made them revise their 
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Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamist ideas.
124
 Although the Musavat was the strongest 
political movement in Baku by 1917, the Bolsheviks were also effective in Baku 
where they formed the Baku Commune in 1918.
125
 
 
 The situation of the Armenian political movement was different from the two 
other examples. The events of the First World War caused great hostility between the 
Armenians and the Turks which resulted with a conflict between the Azerbaijanis 
and the Armenians. The Armenians were in favor of any Russian government which 
would be anti-Turkish. In this context, the Armenians were loyal to the Provisional 
Government just like the Georgian Mensheviks but for different reasons. The 
Dashnaktsutyun, with its party program and military formation symbolized the only 
working institution of the Armenians.
126
 
 
 In this political environment, the Transcaucasian Soviets formed a Regional 
Center (Kraevoi tsentr sovetov) in Tiflis in order to coordinate their work in the 
spring of 1917. The Center, which is controlled by proletarian organs of self-rule, 
“passed resolutions on all political and economic measures of general interest for the 
Caucasus and enforced them through a network of subordinate provincial soviets.”127 
Due to this political agreement among the soviets, the period from the February 1917 
revolution to the October 1917 Revolution was not turbulent for Transcaucasus 
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region, which was not largely affected by the anarchy caused by the breakdown of 
the political institutions and the officers of the disintegrated army.
128
 
 
 After the October Revolution, Soviet power was established in Petrograd and 
Moscow, which were the political and administrative centers of the country. 
However, in a number of regions, the Soviets were opposed by counterrevolutionary 
forces, and consequently the process of the establishment of Soviet power resulted in 
a civil war in these regions.
129
 Transcaucasus was one of the regions where the harsh 
conditions of the revolution became apparent. Refusing to recognize the Bolshevik 
government in Petrograd, the socialist parties of Transcaucasus, except for local 
Bolsheviks, gradually separated the region from Russia “by first declaring autonomy 
and later independence for the whole Transcaucasia and finally establishing three 
separate independent republics.”130  
 
 
3.2.1 Transcaucasian Federative Republic (1918) 
 
 
 In the course of 1917, the political parties of the three principal nationalities 
of Transcaucasus reorganized hastily and undertook important roles in 
Transcaucasian affairs.
131
 Apart from refusing to recognize the Bolshevik rule, the 
political leaders of Transcaucasus were concerned about the dissolution of the 
Russian army and a possible Turkish advance in Transcaucasus as a result. The fear 
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of being invaded by the Turks on the part of the Georgians and the Armenians, and 
the need for an organization to deal with problems such as the influx of returning 
soldiers necessitated the creation of an institution.
132
 Nevertheless, many 
Transcaucasian leaders did not want to secede from Russia. Therefore, they decided 
to establish a regional autonomy until the constitutional system in Russia re-
established. They later formed an interim government under the name of 
Transcaucasian Commissariat (Zakavkazskii Komissariat) in November 1917.
133
 
Georgian Mensheviks were dominant in this Commissariat
134
 which was chaired by a 
Georgian Menshevik E.P. Gegechkori. One other Menshevik, two Socialist 
Revolutionaries, two Dashnaks, four Musavatists and one Georgian Federalist were 
the other members of the Commissariat.
135
 
 
 Transcaucasian Commissariat was the first attempt to create a proper federal 
structure, although the vertical and horizontal organizations of the authority were not 
very clear.
136
 The main aim of the Commissariat was to provide order in the region 
until the establishment of a new government for the entire Russia by the All-Russian 
Constituent Assembly. However, the Bolsheviks suspended the Constituent 
Assembly, and the Transcaucasian Commissariat formed a Transcaucasian Diet, i.e. 
Parliament, (Zakavkazskii Seim) on 10 February 1918.
137
 The Seim was basically a 
parliamentary coalition composed of deputies elected from different regions of 
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Transcaucasus for the Constituent Assembly.
138
 The Bolsheviks refused to 
participate in the Seim and protested its establishment.
139
 
 
 Thereby, at the beginning of the February 1918, Transcaucasus region had 
two administrative organs: a legislative body (seim) and an executive organ 
(komissariat)
140
 which assumed effective control over the region. There were two 
urgent problems threatening the security of Transcaucasus to be dealt by these 
organs: the influx of returning soldiers and Bolshevism.
141
 However, in March 1918, 
a greater threat for Transcaucasus emerged in the shape of the marching Ottoman 
Third Army.  
 
 The war between the Russian Caucasian Army and the Ottoman Third Army 
was stopped by the Armistice of Erzincan on December 18, 1917. The vacuum 
created by the retreating Russian forces was filled by the Armenian militia in Eastern 
Turkey. They were engaging the Ottoman forces and terrorizing the civilians in 
Eastern Anatolia.
142
  Ottoman General Vehib Paşa sent a telegram to General 
Odishelidze, the commander of the Russian Caucasian Army, demanding “the 
termination of Armenian violence against the Muslims” on January 22, 1918.143 
Despite the fact that General Odishelidze gave assurances that the Armenian attacks 
would stop, the violence continued. Therefore, Enver Paşa concluded that Eastern 
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Anatolia could only be stabilized by a military operation. He ordered Vehib Paşa to 
complete the preparations for a new operation to be initiated on February 12, 1918.
144
 
 
 With the advance of the Ottoman Third Army on February 12, 1918, Turkish 
march to Baku started.
145
 Turkish forces entered Erzincan on February 13, Trabzon 
on February 24 and Erzurum on March 12.
146
 Finally on March 14, the Third Army 
reached to the Turco-Russian border of 1914.
147
 In the meantime, Russian Bolshevik 
regime signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918 with Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire,
148
 without consulting Transcaucasian countries, and promised to 
cede Kars, Ardahan and Batum provinces back to the Turks.  The Seim was now 
facing the threat of the approaching Ottoman Third Army. The telegram received on 
March 10 from Vehib Paşa demanding the evacuation of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum 
provinces demonstrated the urgency of the situation for the Seim. The Seim objected 
to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and decided to seek a separate treaty with the Turks.
149
 
However, Transcaucasian Parliament did not have the legal grounds to sign a 
separate treaty since it had not yet declared its independence from Russia.
150
 During 
the Conference of Trabzon (March 14-April 14, 1918), Turkish authorities stipulated 
the declaration of independence of the Transcaucasian countries from Russia and the 
acceptance of Brest-Litovsk Treaty by the Seim, as a condition for further 
negotiations.
151
 During the course of the conference, the Third Army entered 
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Sarıkamış on April 5 and Batum, where the world’s first oil pipeline connecting the 
Batum port to Baku existed, on April 14, 1918.
152
  
 
 Then, the critical situation in Transcaucasus became evident. It was a region, 
without a united authority, under the direct threat of advancing Turkish forces. 
Therefore, Transcaucasian nations started to debate over the question of 
independence which was put forward by the Turks. The underlying reason of this 
debate was the idea that the independence option would liberate them from more 
misfortunes that the Bolsheviks might bring. The debates were ended with the 
decision of the Seim for the secession of Transcaucasus from Russia.
153
 Finally on 
April 22, 1918, the Seim proclaimed the independence of Transcaucasian Federative 
Republic (Zakavkazskaia Federativnaia Respublika).
154
 The government of the new 
state was comprised of a coalition of the three principal national parties- the 
Mensheviks, the Musavatists and the Dashnaks-, which was led by Akaki 
Chkhenkeli, a Georgian Menshevik.
155
 
  
 By declaring the independence of the Transcaucasian Federative Republic, 
Transcaucasian countries finally acquiesced to the Ottoman demands and recognized 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. However, Batum Peace Conference (May 11-June 4, 
1918), aimed at establishing peace between the Ottomans and the Transcaucasians on 
the principles of Brest-Litovsk Treaty revealed important differences among the 
Transcaucasian nations which would end up with the dissolution of the 
Transcaucasian Federative Republic in May 26, 1918.  
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3.2.2 Dual Statehood, Nationalist Independence and the Bolshevik Takeover of 
Transcaucasus 
 
 
 Transcaucasian Federative Republic was an ephemeral experience for 
Transcaucasian countries. It lasted only five weeks (April 22, 1918-May 26, 1918) 
and then vanished due to the divergent views among the Transcaucasian 
nationalities. The main reason for the dissolution was that every nation was seeking 
for the support of a Great Power. Towards the end of the war, Georgia sided with 
Germany, Azerbaijan sided with the Ottoman Empire, and the Armenians made an 
attempt to get British and Russian support.
156
  
 
 Under the pressure of German and Turkish forces, the federation disintegrated 
into separate republics: Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. On 26 May 1918, the 
Seim dissolved itself.
157
 On the same day, Georgia placed itself under the German 
protectorate, and Azerbaijan declared its independence on 28 May 1918.
158
 Gence 
became the capital of independent Azerbaijan.
159
 The Azerbaijanis desired to march 
to and control Baku, where the Bolsheviks established a Soviet government in mid-
April.
160
  
 
 Ottoman Empire signed separate peace treaties with Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia at the end of the Batum Conference on 4 June 1918. As a result of the treaty 
signed with Georgia, Ottoman Empire annexed Ahıska and Ahalkelek districts and 
reached to its frontiers in 1828. On the other hand, on its frontiers with Armenia and 
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Azerbaijan, Ottoman Empire reached its 1877-1878 line.
161
 The treaty signed with 
Azerbaijan on the same day paved the way for further march of Ottoman forces 
deeper in Transcaucasus. With this treaty, Ottoman Empire assured military 
assistance to Azerbaijan. Finally on September 15, 1918, the Turkish troops entered 
Baku.
162
 However, after the Armistice of Mudros was signed between the Ottoman 
Empire and the Allies on October 30, 1918, Turkish troops had to evacuate the city 
in accordance with the articles of the armistice.
163
 At the evacuation,
164
 Baku’s 
administration was handed over to British troops on November 17.
165
 The city 
remained under the British occupation until August 1919.
166
 
 
 The independent republics of Transcaucasus were not able to become stable 
and prosperous states mostly due to the chaotic environment after the war. They were 
suffering from administrative, economic, financial, and agricultural problems. 
Moreover, the relations among these three states were not peaceful at all.
 167
 Still, 
these three nations maintained their political systems. Mensheviks-Social Democrats 
constituted the strongest political movement in Georgia while Musavatists dominated 
the Azerbaijani political life; and the Dashnaks were the most effective political 
force in Armenia.  
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 After two years of full independence, all three republics were attacked by the 
Russian Red Army. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were first turned into separate 
Soviet Socialist Republics. Georgia was the last which came under the Soviet rule in 
1921, following the falls of the independent republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 
1920. The takeover of Georgia by the Soviet power “completed the process of 
reconquest of the separated borderlands and initiated the last phase in the formation 
of the Soviet Union: the integration of the conquered territories into a single state.”168 
In line with this aim, Soviet power consolidated Transcaucasian organizations, such 
as the Economic Bureau of Transcaucasian Republics.
169
  
 
 The Soviet state dictated the need for economic and military-political union 
of the Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Republics by providing the “recovery of the 
economy, the elimination of inter-ethnic distrust and hostility which was heightened 
by a three year economic management of Musavatists, Dashnaks and Georgian 
Mensheviks.”170 Accordingly, Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic 
(Zakavkazskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Federativnaia Sovetskaia Respublika-ZSFSR), 
which would be analyzed in detail in the following sections, was established in 1922. 
 
 For this first phase of the establishment of the Soviet power in Transcaucasia, 
it would be enough to say that the Soviet authorities did not have much idea what to 
do exactly with this region. Having experienced a two plus years of independence, 
this border region was comparatively difficult to deal with, considering especially the 
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existence of hostilities among the three major Transcaucasian nations. With the 
establishment of the Soviet power in the region, Transcaucasian nations witnessed a 
decade of reconciliation and integration during the 1920s. Among the numerous 
policy instruments of the Soviet state which determined the later developments in the 
region was the nationalities policy, a policy that shaped the region in every respect. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
TRANSCAUCASUS UNDER THE SOVIET RULE (1922-1945) 
 
 
 
 After the Bolshevik takeover of Transcaucasus, the process of establishing the 
Soviet power in the region began. In order to assume its authority on the non-Russian 
nationalities of the state, the Bolsheviks initiated a state-nation building policy which 
aimed at creating a Soviet nation. By means of nationalities policy and delimitation 
of borders, autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts came into being in 
Transcaucasus. After the 1920s, korenizatsiia, New Economic Policy and 
collectivization processes, and after the 1930s, purges, deportations and the Second 
World War inevitably transformed the Transcaucasus region thoroughly with its 
peoples, socio-economic and political conditions, and delineation. Therefore, the 
analysis of the Soviet era is of utmost importance in terms of understanding 
Transcaucasus, especially considering that the underlying reasons of the enduring 
problems in the region were the results of Soviet policies in Transcaucasus.  
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4.1 Stalin and the Nationalities Question 
 
 
 Nationalities question was one of the primary occupations of the Bolsheviks 
since approximately 130 different nations and nationalities had lived throughout 
Russia.
171
 The Bolshevik state adopted the Leninist view on the nationalities question 
by focusing on the issue of national self-determination. Although the classical 
Marxism does not address the question of nationalities, it was Lenin who established 
an understanding of right of self-determination of nations for the creation of a 
socialist state. By stating that “Victorious socialism must necessarily establish a full 
democracy and, consequently, not only introduce full equality of nations but also 
realize the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination, i.e., the right to free 
political separation,”172 he extended the notion to the oppressed peoples, and 
emphasized the equality among the nations. 
 
 Although Lenin endorsed the right of nations to secede, he did not imply that 
any separatist movement should be promoted. In this context, he specified that the 
separation “implies only a consistent expression of struggle against all national 
oppression.”173  A significant point to bear in mind was that Lenin’s understanding of 
self-determination had nothing common with the national-cultural autonomy; it was 
exclusively about political self-determination. Moreover, a centralized state and a 
centralized party were essential to secure socialism for Lenin.
174
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Stalin reiterated Lenin’s views on the right of nations to self-determination. 
He explained the notion of self-determination as: “The right of self-determination 
means that only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, that no one has 
the right forcibly to interfere in the life of the nation, to destroy its schools and other 
institutions, to violate its habits and customs, to repress its language, or curtail its 
rights.”175 He pointed out that the workers should combat against oppression in all its 
forms and Social Democracy should guarantee the right of nations for self-
determination.
176
 It can be inferred from this statement that Stalin had an 
understanding of self-determination which was limited to the proletariat. Moreover, 
he particularly emphasized that the principles of equality, sovereignty, and the right 
of self-determination of nations would not mean that Social Democracy would 
support every demand of all nations. In his notion of self-determination, Social 
Democracy would combat against the “harmful” demands of nations.177  
 
The policy of the Bolsheviks towards nationalities was galvanized “by the 
ideology of egalitarianism and by the goal of national unification”178 within the 
context of the abovementioned Leninist principles. This policy was aimed towards 
two different goals: “to maintain equality among the nations and to strengthen the 
Soviet state” which meant Soviet control over the nations.179  
 
 As soon as the Soviet state was formed, the Bolsheviks established The 
People’s Commissariat for Nationalities (Narodnyy komissariat po delam 
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natsionalnostei-Narkomnats) at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 
November 8, 1917 by the decree on the Establishment of the Council of People’s 
Commissars (Sovet Narodnyy Komissariat-Sovnarkom).
180
 This Commissariat 
(Ministry) was in charge of the nationalities question. The Narkomnats was 
“intended to serve as an intermediary between the central Soviet organs and the 
minorities and to assist the Government in dealing with problems of a purely national 
character.”181 The aim and structure of the Narkomnats were determined by the 
political and ideological perspectives of the Bolsheviks.  
 
These perspectives mainly included the aim of retaining the empire-if 
necessary, by force-, the acceptance of an undefined federal state structure, the need 
for an institution which would legalize the political participation of the minorities. 
Additionally, the continuation of the unitary and centralized party structure, the aim 
of spreading the revolution to Finland, Poland, Eastern Europe, and Asia via the 
party’s nationalities policy, and lastly the realization of the self-determination 
principle were also among these perspectives.
182
 The official publication of the 
Narkomnats was the Zhizn’ natsional’nostei (Life of Nationalities). The articles 
published in Zhizn’ natsional’nostei were mostly focused on socialism and issues 
relevant to the nationalities. Especially, there were debates about how the future of 
the new Bolshevik state would be shaped concerning the nationalities question.
183
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 After the establishment of Narkomnats, a further step on the nationalities 
question was taken by the promulgation of the Declaration of the Rights of Peoples 
of Russia on November 15, 1917 by the approval of Sovnarkom.
184
 Being one of the 
first acts of the Soviet state, the Declaration emphasized following principles of 
Leninist nationalities policy:  
equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; the self-
determination      right of the peoples of Russia, including secession 
and the formation of an independent state; the abolition of all 
privileges and restrictions based on ethnic or ethnic-religious 
distinctions; and the free development of national minorities and 
ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.
185
   
 
 Moreover, with the Declaration, acts of provocation of the nations against 
each other and the oppression of the nations were denounced by the Soviet state on 
the grounds that these acts were in contrast with the “policy of voluntary union of the 
peoples of Russia.”186 
 
 In accordance with the self-determination principle, Bolshevik leaders 
intended to grant cultural and linguistic rights, autonomy and even territory to the 
non-Russian people in order to hinder any kind of separatist movement. In this 
context, the understanding of national culture by the Bolsheviks was of utmost 
importance. The main concept of national culture under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat for the Bolsheviks was best described by Stalin as “socialist in content and 
national in form.”187 In this way, under the supremacy of the proletariat, the national 
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differences and antagonisms between people would vanish.
188
 On the other hand, in 
the Bolshevik understanding, giving equal cultural rights to each nation was a means 
to divide some larger groups,
189
 which would prevent these groups from attaining 
political unity.  
 
 In time, the idea of giving the right of self-determination to nations in a 
federation gained strength, mostly due to the increasing number of autonomies. At 
the Third-All Russian Congress of Soviets in January 1918, it was declared that 
federalism was accepted as a principle and the future Soviet state would be a 
federation of national republics.
190
 The consequence of adopting the principle of 
federalism was the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. With 
the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR in December 1922, four Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the Ukrainian 
SSR, the Belorussian SSR, and the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia), were integrated into the Union. The 
Treaty was confirmed at the First Congress of Soviets on December 30, 1922 along 
with the Declaration on the Formation of the USSR. Finally, on January 31, 1924, 
the First Constitution of the USSR was issued at the Second Congress of Soviets of 
the USSR and the Treaty, which was based on Leninist principles aiming at the 
creation of a federal socialist state, was consolidated into the Constitution.
 191
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4.1.1 Korenizatsiia (Nativization) 
 
 
 The content of the Soviet nationalities policy was delineated by the 
resolutions passed at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 and at a special 
Central Committee (TsK) conference on nationalities policy in June 1923. The 
Bolshevik nationalities policy was determined by these two resolutions. These 
resolutions “affirmed that the Soviet state would maximally support those forms of 
nationhood that did not conflict with a unitary central state” which “meant a 
commitment to support the following four national forms: national territories, 
national languages, national elites, and national cultures.”192 
 
 In line with the new principles, a political doctrine under the name of 
korenizatsiia was established as the crucial agenda item of the Soviet nationalities 
policy in 1923. The word korenizatsiia was derived from korennoi narod (indigenous 
people) as an expression of the Bolsheviks’ decolonizing rhetoric.193 Although the 
origins of korenizatsiia were generated as early as 1920, its transformation into a 
policy was brought by the 1923 resolutions. Korenizatsiia basically meant raising a 
new generation of political and technocratic cadres from the titular nationalities of 
the non-Russian regions. The policy was aimed at promoting local leaders and 
paving the way for the administration of the national republics by their own native 
cadres with the aim of consolidating the Soviet power over these nationalities.  
 
 The doctrine was originally derived from Stalin’s objective of consolidation 
of Soviet control over the borderlands. This has also included eliminating the threat 
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of centrifugal pressures, cementing the Soviet power among the non-Russians, 
transforming the native society economically, socially, and culturally, and exploiting 
the borderlands economically.
194
 In Stalin’s own words, korenizatsiia can be best 
explained as: 
Soviet power must become just as near and dear to the masses of 
the border regions of Russia. But this requires that it should first of 
all become comprehensible to them. It is therefore necessary that 
all Soviet organs in the border regions—the courts, the 
administration, the economic bodies, the organs of direct authority 
(and the organs of the Party as well)—should as far as possible be 
recruited from the local people acquainted with the manner of life, 
habits, customs and language of the native population; that all the 
best people from the local masses should be drawn into these 
institutions; that the local labouring masses should participate in 
every sphere of administration of the country, including the 
formation of military units, in order that the masses should see that 
the Soviet power and its organs are the products of their own 
efforts, the embodiment of their aspirations. Only in this way can 
firm spiritual ties be established between the masses and the Soviet 
power, and only in this way can the Soviet power become 
comprehensible and dear to the labouring masses of the border 
regions.
195
 
 
 The policy of korenizatsiia became the main approach of the Soviet state 
towards the nationalities question during the 1920s. Moreover, being mixed with the 
socialist principles, it turned the Soviet state into “the world’s first affirmative action 
empire,”196 which was “the first of the old European multiethnic states to confront 
the rising tide of nationalism and respond by systematically promoting the national 
consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many of the 
characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state.”197 
 
                                                          
194
 Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, p. 50.; d’Encausse, pp. 20-21.; Donald W. 
Treadgold and Herbert J. Ellison, Twentieth Century Russia (Colorado: Westview, 2000), pp.227-228. 
195
 Joseph Stalin, "The Policy of Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia," In Works, 
Vol. 4, 363-76 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), pp. 370-371. 
196
 See: Martin. 
197
 Martin, p. 1. 
48 
 
 Thanks to korenizatsiia, local national cadres were integrated into the Soviet 
institutions such as the labor unions and the party organs. These peoples went 
through an experience of quasi-nation state due to the use of native languages, 
establishment of national academies and creation of national literature.
198
 During this 
period, korenizatsiia was a tool to cement the nations of the Soviet state. 
Transcaucasian nationalities were parts of this process as well. After the period of 
national independence between 1918 and 1920, an important portion of the national 
cadres of Transcaucasian nationalities had joined to the ranks of the Bolsheviks. 
Then, korenizatsiia helped them to be integrated into the Soviet state structure.  
 
 However, during the 1930s, Stalin aimed at creating a multinational, Russian 
speaking Soviet state. Therefore, a change in the political and social way of life in 
Soviet Russia emerged, which would bring an end to korenizatsiia. In this period 
Russocentric tendencies dominated the political, social and economic life. On the 
political level, more authoritarian and unitary approaches prevailed upon the pluralist 
idealist approaches. On the social and economic level, a reform process including the 
industrialization and collectivization resulted in a more centralized administration. 
 
 
4.1.2 New Economic Policy (1921-1928) and Collectivization 
 
 
 During the civil war, the peasantry throughout Russia was subject to several 
measures due to the harsh conditions of the war such as compulsory grain 
requisitioning (prodrazverstka). By early 1921, this kind of measures resulted in 
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peasant strikes in many regions of Russia such as Volga provinces, Siberia, Moscow 
and Petrograd.
199
 In March 1921, an uprising occurred among the sailors, who 
supported the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, in the naval base of Kronstadt. These 
uprisings showed the necessity of a new approach in economics. 
 
 Finally, at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, the principles of the New 
Economic Policy (Novaia Ekonomicheskaia Politika-NEP), as a new approach, were 
introduced by Lenin.
200
 Main essence of NEP was established on the alliance 
between the working class and the peasantry on economic basis. In order to draw the 
peasants into the socialist construction, a link between socialist industry and small-
scale peasant enterprises was tried to be created through the rather liberal money-
commodity relations.
201
 Grain requisitioning was replaced with a fixed tax and the 
peasants were let to sell their products at free market prices after paying this tax. 
Moreover, the society was able to engage in legal private economic sector, and large 
industrial enterprises were established. Although the Bolshevik state granted huge 
concessions to private enterprises during this period, efforts for the centrally planned 
system of industrialization has continued.
202
 
 
 Lenin and the Bolsheviks believed that by permitting a limited capitalism to 
work out in economics and a competition between the capitalist and socialist sectors, 
the construction of socialism would be completed successfully in Russia. During the 
period of NEP, the supply of both the agricultural and industrial products increased, 
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and both the heavy and the light industries were developed.
203
 Finally, the 
abovementioned competition was terminated in favor of socialism in 1928 with the 
early practices of collectivization as a tool of centralization policies. 
 
 Collectivization (kollektivizatsiia) process was initiated in 1929 and mostly 
completed by the mid-1930s. It meant the transformation of small, individual peasant 
farms into large public farms through cooperatives,
204
 as a requirement of socialist 
economy. Collectivization involved the creation of large state-owned enterprises on 
the one hand, and the gradual transformation of individual peasant farms into 
collective farms on the other.
205
 Essentially, collectivization aimed at introducing 
socialist organizational formations to the peoples living in the countryside and 
altering “the nature of the relationship between the rural and the industrial sectors of 
the Soviet economy.”206  
 
 
4.1.3 The USSR in Transition: Some Results 
 
 
 Thanks to nationalities policy and 1924 delimitation of borders, an ethnic 
mosaic of Union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous regions and non-
territorial national autonomies came into being. 
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Collectivization was actually an attack on the nationalities that were granted 
large scale national liberties by the korenizatsiia before. This was because the 
transition period of collectivization was violent,
207
 and the masses that showed 
resistance to the collectivization were suppressed by the Soviet authorities. 
Collectivization went hand in hand with the raskulachivanie (dekulakization) policy. 
More than 1.8 million of better-off peasants, branded as ‘kulaks’, were accused of 
being class enemies and either liquidated or deported to Siberia and Central Asia 
between the years 1929-1932. 
 
 Even the national communists of these nationalities witnessed a punishment 
process under the name of the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, in order to 
prevent any national deviation. Throughout 1930s, leading intellectuals and 
politicians of non-Russian peoples were exposed to purges and trials on the grounds 
that they were bolstering anti-Soviet nationalism.
208
  
 
 In some cases, ethnically different peoples were compelled to live together, in 
a way ignoring their religious and/or linguistic differences, while in other cases the 
peoples belonging to the same ethnic group were separated from each other thanks to 
the borders drawn by the abovementioned nationalities policy. This policy would 
show its impacts in the shape of intense conflicts after the 1980s, especially after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union.  
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Furthermore, thanks to administrative centralization achieved by 
collectivization uniform cultural, social and educational policies by Moscow were 
started to be imposed upon all peoples of the Union. For example, educational policy 
was designed according to the principles of Russification. The Soviet authorities 
again forced the non-Russian peoples to leave their traditions by making the Russian 
language compulsory in education,
209
 replacing the scripts of these nationalities by 
Latin, and then Cyrillic, and suppressing the ethnic literatures.
210
   
 
 Return to the Russian nationalism was succeeded by the apotheosis of the 
patriotic Russian symbols such as Alexander Nevsky and Peter the Great.
211
 As the 
history was considered to be one of the most important policy tools in the Soviet 
Union, the histories of the non-Russian peoples were subjected to revisions in 
accordance with the resurgence of traditional Russian symbols.
212
 In this context, the 
views of two historians, Mikhail Pokrovsky and Mykhailo Hrushevsky, were 
denounced which had previously presented the Russian Empire “as the unremitting 
oppressor of the non-Russians.”213 The official history writing in the Union then 
appraised the Russian Empire as a conveyor of civilization and progress. 
 
 At the Extraordinary 8
th 
All-Union Congress of Soviets on November 25, 
1936, Stalin declared the necessary conditions for national territories to gain Union 
Republic status. First, the Republic must have been a border republic; second, the 
nationality which had given its name to the Republic must have been a majority, and 
                                                          
209
 Graham Smith, "Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev," In G. Smith, ed., The Nationalities 
Question in the Soviet Union (New York: Longman, 1990), p. 6. 
210
 Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, pp. 61-75. 
211
Simon Dixon, "The Russians: The Dominant Nationality," In G. Smith, ed., The Nationalities 
Question in the Soviet Union (New York: Longman, 1990), p. 24. 
212
 Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice, pp. 79-88. 
213
 Smith, "Nationalities Policies, Soviet," p.1013. 
53 
 
the last, the Republic must have had a population no less than a million.
214
 At the end 
of this Congress, on December 5, 1936, the Constitution of the Soviet Union was 
approved and adopted.
215
 Based on this Constitution, constitutions of the Union 
republics
216
 were approved respectively.
217
 
 
Due to the rising international tension towards the end of the 1930s and the 
threat perception of Soviet Russia from Japan along with the Nazi Germany, more 
strict applications of Russification and centralization emerged.
218
 The purges of the 
late 1930s were fiercer than the previous purges. The year 1936 marked the 
beginning of the most repressive period of the Soviet history; the period of Great 
Terror (1936-1938).
219
 Central Soviet power has inserted a reign of terror over 
national republics and especially over the native cadres raised by the wave of 
korenizatsiia. A large number of national officials were arrested, executed, 
committed suicide, exiled or disappeared in most cases.
220
 Also in this period, some 
diaspora nationalities were identified as potential threats and subjected to exiles, 
mass deportations and executions.
221
 The first instance of an en masse deportation of 
an ethnic group in the USSR was the deportation of the Koreans.
222
 More than 
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170,000 Koreans were accused of being Japanese agents
223
  and deported from Far 
East to Central Asia in 1937. The deportations reached their climax by the time the 
USSR engaged in war with Germany. 
 
The nations of Transcaucasus were inevitably affected by the 
abovementioned policies and practices. Just like all nations of the Soviet Union, 
Transcaucasians were also subject to all these policies and their consequences. 
 
 
4.2 Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic-ZSFSR (1922-1936)  
 
 
In 1921, six Soviet republics existed in Russia: the Russian Soviet Federated 
Republic, Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, Georgian SSR, Azerbaijani SSR and 
Armenian SSR. In late 1921, an important question was raised on how to deal with 
these border republics. As an answer to this question, Stalin aimed at establishing 
greater control over these three republics, starting with the republics of 
Transcaucasia.
224
 Therefore, the unification of three republics was favored on the 
grounds that:  
 
internal and international positions of the Georgian SSR, Armenian 
SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR after the Civil War and military 
intervention of 1918-20 necessitated their economic and military-
political union in the fight against the hostile actions of the 
imperialists and the remnants of the Transcaucasian 
counterrevolution, the restoration of the economy, the elimination 
of inter-ethnic distrust and hostility.
225
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Among these three nationalities, the Georgians opposed the unification of the 
three republics and declared that they would preserve their individual identity as a 
separate republic.
226
 Stalin and Ordzhonikidze
227
 insisted on the unification of the 
three Transcaucasian Republics, and their supporters finally surpassed the opposition 
within Georgia.
228
 
 
On March 12, 1922, a conference was organized in Tiflis, with the 
participation of representatives from the central executive committees of the three 
Soviet republics. During the conference, a treaty creating the Federated Union of 
Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia was approved. The chief authority of the 
union was determined as the Authorized Conference of Representatives, which 
would be selected in equal number by the governments of the republics; the 
executive organ was determined as the Union Council, which would be elected by 
the conference. On December 13, 1922, at the first Transcaucasian Congress of 
Soviets organized in Baku, Federated Union was transformed into the single 
Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (Zakavkazskaia 
Sotsialisticheskaia Federativnaia Sovetskaia Respublika-ZSFSR). The congress also 
approved the Constitution of the Transcaucasian Federation and established the 
Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee (ZTsIK), and the Council of People’s 
Commissariats (Sovnarkom), which would be responsible to the Committee. Finally 
on December 30, 1922, the ZSFSR was integrated into the USSR.
229
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By the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union, ZSFSR was dissolved and the 
three Transcaucasian states were given the status of separate union republics.
230
 
Effective on 1936, Soviet Socialist Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia 
became directly subordinate to Moscow administratively, without any intermediate 
Transcaucasian administration.
231
 However, the national minorities in these republics 
retained their status.
232
 Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and the Autonomous 
Republic of Nakhichevan stayed within Azerbaijan, while the South Osetian 
Autonomous Region and the Abkhazian and Adjaran Autonomous Republics were 
consolidated into Georgia as three separate administrative units. 
 
 
4.3 Transition in the Soviet Transcaucasus  
 
 
 During the Soviet period, Transcaucasus had changed tremendously. 
Administrative, legislative and executive structures of the region were re-defined by 
the Bolsheviks. Due to the implementation of the nationalities policy as a whole, the 
region was transformed socially, economically and culturally as well. As mentioned 
above, the promulgation of Declaration of the Rights of Peoples of Russia on 
November 15, 1917 had already induced the establishment of federalism. Moreover, 
the principles of the Declaration granted the non-Russian nationalities some rights. 
During the 1920s, national education system and written national languages were 
created for the peoples of Transcaucasus, which in the end “contributed to the 
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preservation and reproduction of ethnicity.”233 The policy of korenizatsiia was 
implemented simultaneously with these developments. However, towards the end of 
the 1920s, Russocentric tendencies became evident and dominated the nationalities 
policy. Significant changes continued during the period of NEP, collectivization and 
purges. 
 
 Administratively, new national quasi-states were formed in the 
Transcaucasus. The foundations of today’s ethno-territorial disputes in the region 
were laid during Stalin era and under his nationalities policy. The creation of 
territorial units which did not accord with the ethnic realities of these territories was 
the main tool of Stalin’s nationalities policy. This policy resulted in ethnic rivalries 
and clashes between different ethnic groups in a single political unit,
234
 which are 
extant even today. 
 
 
4.3.1 Nationalities Policy in Transcaucasus 
 
 
 Although the ultimate aims of Soviet nationalities policy were acculturation 
and bilingualism, assimilation, and the creation of a multinational type of Soviet 
people, the early practices of the nationalities policy in Transcaucasus based on the 
ethnic consolidation and growing cohesion of the major nationalities,
235
 which were 
initiated by the nativization policies. However, these policies were altered in the 
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subsequent decades due to the increasing promotion of Russification all over the 
Union.  
 
 As the first step of the nationalities policy, the policy of korenizatsiia was 
implemented in Transcaucasus during the 1920s. As mentioned above, korenizatsiia 
was the practice of raising a new generation of political and technocratic cadres from 
the titular nationalities of the non-Russian regions which was aimed at promoting 
local leaders and paving the way for the administration of the national republics by 
their own native cadres with the aim of consolidating the Soviet power over these 
nationalities. This policy worked well especially in Georgia and Armenia, where the 
percentage of the socialist oriented natives in rule was higher with respect to the 
population.  
 
 Along with korenizatsiia, the modernization attempts of the Soviet power 
were seen in Transcaucasus during the 1920s and 1930s. The change from rural 
lifestyle to the urbanization and from agricultural based economy to industrialization 
marked the modernization process in Transcaucasus, which, in the end, entailed the 
transition of the Transcaucasian nationalities. 
 
 First and foremost, the Bolsheviks faced an economically devastated country 
along with a strong ideological opposition of the Mensheviks in Georgia. Due to this 
economic downturn, modernization and industrialization waves during the 1920s 
were not successful. This setback was also originated from the predominantly rural 
structure of the Georgian society. By 1921, approximately 70% of the Georgian 
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national income was based on agriculture and some 85.5% of the population lived in 
the countryside.
236
 
 
 Therefore, the first attempts of the Soviet power to modernize Georgia did not 
succeed much. The collectivization and industrialization in Georgia took place 
between the years 1928 and 1932 genuinely. The most intense phase of the 
collectivization took place between October 1929 and March 1930. In this period, the 
number of collectivized families increased to 65.2% from 3.4%.
237
 During the 
collectivization process, Soviet power used violence against those who opposed the 
collectivization. Finally, at the end of the 1930s, almost 93% of agriculture was 
collectivized. Rapid industrialization was striking, as in the case of the 
transformation of agriculture. Between 1930 and 1934, the number of industrial 
workforce doubled itself as well as the population of Tiflis.
238
As can be seen in the 
following section, the political purges of 1936-1938 followed these developments 
and eliminated most of the Georgian intelligentsia and the Georgian Mensheviks. By 
the end of the 1930s, Georgia was mostly transformed economically and socially. A 
new type of peasants, intelligentsia and party circle was created owing to the Soviet 
system. 
 
 The aim of the Soviet nationalities policy was twofold in Azerbaijan: keeping 
its economic resources under control in order to secure the interests of the Soviet 
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power, and creating a loyal population via the carrot and stick system.
239
 Unlike the 
examples of Georgia and Armenia, the Soviet power attempted to Sovietize 
Azerbaijan more fiercely. Apart from a harsh collectivization process and purges, a 
cultural and anti-religious policy was also administered for Azerbaijanis. Their 
alphabet, which was Arabic before, was changed to Latin in 1922 and then to Cyrillic 
in 1939.
240
 Cultural monuments, libraries and archives were decimated
241
 and some 
of the historical sites which had religious significance were demolished.
242
 
 
 Armenia was an economically devastated country by the time of the 
Bolshevik takeover. Therefore, the first problem to deal with for the Soviet power in 
Armenia was to revive the country. Therefore, during the first decade of the Soviet 
rule, the priority of the Bolsheviks was the economic reconstruction. It was 1929 
when the collectivization and industrialization were started to be implemented in the 
country.
243
 By 1935, industry’s share in total economic production increased to 
62.1% and by 1936, the collectivized families constituted 80% of the population. The 
traditional rural lifestyle was replaced by a collective one in which a new class of 
Sovietized urban proletariat was created in towns.
 244
  
 
 The forced collectivization and the forced change on the traditional lives of 
the Transcaucasian nationalities reversed the process of korenizatsiia. While the 
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interest in native values such as native languages was awakened by the Soviet power 
by the time the formation of the Union, the forced collectivization aimed at driving 
the people apart from their native traditional values. As a result, the forcefully 
imposed rapid social mobilization and industrialization along with Sovietization 
contributed to the national awareness among the people. 
 
 The efforts of nation-building and the enhancement of the national culture 
lost its significance in early 1930s, as mentioned above. A distrust campaign towards 
the non-Russian people was boosted by the Soviet power, led by Stalin. During the 
1930s, the nationalist expressions and local nationalism were denounced on the 
grounds that they threatened the Soviet unity. The level of autonomy of the non-
Russian republics was constrained as a practice of this approach.  
 
 Although the three Transcaucasian nationalities were subjected to Stalin’s 
repression, they were not subjected to harsher practices such as man-made famines as 
in the case of the Ukrainians and Kazakhs. Moreover, when Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Armenia were uplifted to Union Republic status, their societies were not inflicted 
with overwhelming Russification attempts as it was the case in some other union 
republics.  
 
Consequently, Soviet nationalities policy in Transcaucasus alternated 
between giving concessions to the people on the one hand, and centralizing the 
authority and assimilating the ethnic groups on the other. Still, the republics were 
developed economically. Apart from industrialization and urbanization, the rate of 
literacy and education increased which means that the Soviet economic and political 
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system transformed the Transcaucasian republics from rural societies to 
industrialized and urban societies despite the system’s violence and deficiencies. 
Most importantly, due to the Soviet policies, Transcaucasian nationalities acquired 
an increased awareness of themselves as national entities. 
 
 
4.3.2 Territorial Arrangements in Transcaucasus under the Soviet Rule 
 
 
 As part of the Stalin’s nationalities policy, Transcaucasus was subjected to 
administrative arrangements, as mentioned above, in order to govern the ethnically 
diverse territories and eliminate any nationalistic demands. These arrangements 
underpinned the ethno-territorial disputes that emerged after the demise of the USSR.  
 
 Within this framework, in all three Transcaucasian republics, new 
autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts were established during the Soviet 
era: in the north of the Georgian SSR, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast 
(1922); in the northwest the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
(1931)
245
 and in the west the Adjara Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1921). 
Also, the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1924) was founded as 
an exclave of Azerbaijan SSR,
246
 populated almost exclusively by Azerbaijanis. 
Finally, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (1923), populated mostly by 
Armenians, was established inside the Azerbaijan SSR.
247
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 Stalin’s policy of creating these territorial units where rival ethnic groups 
were gathered within single political units did not correspond to the ethnic realities of 
the region and resulted in significant problems due to the claims of these rival ethnic 
groups on particular territories on the basis of asserted historical rights.
248
 These 
problems inevitably evolved to real conflicts in the last decades of the USSR. 
 
 In the Georgian SSR, three autonomous oblasts/republics were formed. 
Before the Soviet power was established in Georgia, Georgia’s declaration of 
independence in May 1918 cut the link between the North Ossetians and South 
Ossetians living in the region. The sense of isolationism created distrust among the 
South Ossetians towards the Menshevik Georgian government and some protests 
took place, which were brutally suppressed by Georgia. When the Red Army took 
the control of the region and overthrew the Menshevik Georgian government in 
February 1921, South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was created within Georgia on 
April 20, 1922.
249
 In fact, the Ossetians were aiming to create a united republic with 
the unification of the South and the North Ossetians,
250
 which never came into 
existence since the North Ossetian Autonomous Region was located within the 
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic in 1924.
251
  
 
 Once being an autonomous oblast within Georgia, the South Ossetians were 
exposed to Georgianization. Starting from 1930s, all Ossetian schools were closed 
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and Georgian alphabet was introduced. Along with the Georgianization attempts, the 
poor financial and living standards resulted in an anti-Georgian sentiment among the 
South Ossetians.
252
 The increasing reaction against Georgia continued in the coming 
decades and paved the way for national movements among the Ossetians. 
  
 As another problematic region, Abkhazia had already gone under the Russian 
protectorate in 1810, and the Russian Empire annexed Abkhazia in 1864. The 
Russian conquest of Abkhazia in 1864 forced more than half of the Abkhaz 
population into exile to the Ottoman Empire. The rest of the population was forcibly 
converted to Christianity. After the Bolshevik revolution, the Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Abkhazia was established on March 4, 1921. However, in February 
1931, its status was downgraded to Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the 
Georgian SSR.
253
 
 
 During Stalin’s rule, a Georgianization campaign was carried out also in 
Abkhazia, as in the case of South Ossetia.
254
 However, between the two, Abkhazia 
was the most troubled case.
255
 By the end of the 1930s and the start of the 1940s, a 
new Abkhazian alphabet was invented based on the Georgian script, Abkhazian was 
removed from the schools, Georgian became compulsory as the education language, 
Abkhazians were extracted from the power structures, Abkhaz intellectuals were 
arrested and the local Abkhaz names were replaced by Georgian names.
256
 Due to the 
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encouraged migration of Georgians to Abkhazia, the population of the ethnic Abkhaz 
decreased to 15 per cent while it formed 42 per cent of the total population in 
1886.
257
 As a result, the Abkhaz started to voice their discontent of the attempted 
Georgianization.
258
 In time, the discontent turned into an anti-Georgian agitation and 
the Abkhaz tended to affiliate themselves with a North Caucasian identity.
259
 More 
importantly, discriminatory policies of the Stalin years and the Georgian pressure 
bolstered Abkhaz nationalism and resulted in Abkhaz protests for independence later 
during the glasnost era.
260
  
 
 Lastly, Adjara Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed on July 16, 
1921 as a part of the Georgian SSR.
261
 Adjara was the only autonomous republic 
within the USSR based on religion
262
 rather than ethnic roots.
263
 Due to their ethno-
religious identity, Adjars suffered from both the Soviet policies and the 
Georgianization.
264
 During the 1920s, Adjars were exposed to the offensive Soviet 
policy against Islam along with collectivization and some of them were deported to 
Central Asia. Moreover, they were counted as Georgians rather than Adjars in Soviet 
censuses. Therefore, there is a lack of information on their exact population in the 
USSR. During the Soviet rule, they were also subjected to an assimilation policy by 
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the Georgians, including the Christianization. Nevertheless, the Adjars resisted to the 
assimilation policies and preserved their religion.
265
 
 
 As another autonomous republic in Transcaucasus, the Nakhichevan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was created under the Soviet rule. Soviet 
power was first established in Nakhichevan on July 28, 1920. Simultaneously, a 
revolutionary committee was created in the region. On the same day, the 
Nakhichevan Soviet Socialist Republic was formed which had close military and 
economic ties with the Azerbaijan SSR and the RSFSR.
266
  
 
 The Treaty of Moscow (1921) signed between Turkey and the USSR 
envisaged that the region was to be an autonomous region under the protectorate of 
Azerbaijani SSR.
267
 In early 1921, at the First Krai Party Conference, the 
Nakhichevan Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan was chosen. 
Then, the Nakhichevan Autonomous Krai was created within the Azerbaijan SSR, 
based on a resolution came out of the Third All-Nakhichevan Congress of Soviets in 
February 1923. On February 9, 1924, the Krai was transformed to the Nakhichevan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the first constitution of the Nakhichevan 
ASSR was adopted on April 18, 1926.
268
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 Nakhichevan stayed as an exception in the Soviet style of federalism. There is 
no other example of an autonomous republic whose titular nationality is the same 
with the central republic’s titular nationality.269 In spite of the fact that the 
Armenians were frustrated by the loss of both Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh 
and they tried to regain control over the two regions, they mostly focused on the loss 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, and therefore, the ethnic tensions in Nakhichevan did not 
become as problematic as in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 
 Finally, in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was created 
under the Soviet rule in 1923. Nagorno-Karabakh is a historically disputed region 
between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians. According to the Azerbaijanis, 
Nagorno-Karabakh has always been under Azerbaijani rule; while the Armenians 
assert the contrary. The disputed situation of the region can be found in its name; the 
word Karabakh is a combination of Turkish and Persian,
270
 and the word ‘nagorno’ 
means ‘mountainous’ in Russian. Azerbaijanis and Armenians have been debated 
over the history of the region; specifically over both its origin of the population and 
its state affiliation.
271
 The region held a significant place in the historical and ethno-
political views of the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians. The Azerbaijanis see the 
region as the homeland of scientific and cultural figures and the hereditary land of 
Turkic khans. The Armenians, on the other hand, affiliate the region with the 
development of the Armenian people and their religion, art, culture and history.
272
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 Moreover, the region
273
 has always become the scene of clashes between the 
Azerbaijanis and the Armenians. Swietochowski states that “Massive eruptions of 
violence in the form of mutual inter-communal massacres began with the 1905 
Russian Revolution, and would re-emerge each time the Russian state was in a 
condition of crisis or overhaul-during the civil war in 1918 and during the perestroika 
from 1988 on.”274 When Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independences in 
1918, the disputed situation of the region became evident. 
 
 Following the Bolshevik revolution, the dispute over the region was 
politicized and intensified. The international rivalries also determined the changes in 
the region. Initially, Nagorno-Karabakh became a part of Azerbaijan in 1920. 
Despite the opposition of the Armenians, the British supported this arrangement
275
 
and the region stayed as a part of the Azerbaijan SSR until December 1920 when 
Moscow decided to bring the region under Armenian control.
276
 Still, the fate of the 
region was to be determined. On July 4, 1920, in Stalin’s presence, Kavbyuro277 
voted in favor of the inclusion of Karabakh in the Armenian SSR. However, the 
following day the Kavbyuro revoked this decision and agreed to transfer Karabakh to 
the Azerbaijani SSR.
278
 In the end Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was 
established within the Azerbaijani SSR on July 7, 1923.
279
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 Since then, the Armenians persistently tried to persuade Moscow to transfer 
the region to the Armenian SSR. The autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh was 
stipulated by the Stalin constitution of 1936.
 280
 This territorial arrangement laid the 
roots for future conflicts since it caused Armenian aggression and periodic clashes 
between the two nations. 
 
 In the final analysis, the establishment of the above-mentioned territories in 
Transcaucasus under the Soviet rule represents the most decisive circumstance in the 
history of the region, which determined the region’s contemporary situation. The re-
drawn map of Transcaucasus provided the titular nationalities some privileges; 
however, they had always confronted the demands of the non-titular groups. This 
situation was designed as a counterweight to any possible nationalist politics on the 
part of the respective union republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. That 
means the Soviet power aimed at using the new administrative-territorial division as 
an instrument in controlling the national ambitions of the major Transcaucasian 
nationalities.
281
 
 
 Nevertheless, the distorted ethnic balance created an adverse effect. The 
territorial claims caused by the new arrangements fuelled inter-ethnic rivalries. The 
re-drawing of the map of the region regardless of ethnic and demographic facts 
poisoned the already existed ethnic antagonisms rooted in history throughout the 
region.
282
 Not only the titular nationalities, but also the minorities of the region 
showed an increasing nationalist tendency and started to express themselves through 
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nationalism. Thus, and so, the Bolshevik ambitions to create loyal nations in order to 
bring the Soviet state and nation building to perfection resulted in separatist 
demands, crises and clashes, in contrary. 
 
 These cases have been significant determinants in the precarious inter-ethnic 
relations of Transcaucasus. Since their establishments, the problems in these regions 
have haunted from time to time and turned the region into a boiling cauldron, in 
which sometimes the outside forces have intervened. The actual problem, however, 
is that any solution does not seem feasible since a brand new effort for the re-
drawing the map of the region can further complicate the situation. 
 
 
Table 2. The Dates of Formation of the Autonomous Republics and Oblasts of 
Transcaucasus 
 
  
Annexation by                            
the Russian 
Empire 1917-1924 1924-1945 
South Ossetia 1774 1922-Autonomous Oblast  - 
Abkhazia 1864 
1921-Soviet Socialist 
Republic 
1931-
Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist 
Republic  
Adjara 1878 
1921-Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic  
- 
Nakhichevan 1828 
1920-Soviet Socialist 
Republic      1923-
Autonomous Krai        
1924-Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic          
- 
Nagorno-
Karabakh 
1813 1923-Autonomous Oblast - 
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4.3.3 Purges in the Cadres of the Local Communist Parties-The Great Terror in 
Transcaucasus 
 
 
From the very beginning, the ethnicity factor was seen as both an enemy and 
a tool for the Soviet power in terms of nationalities policy. State apparatus used the 
ethnicity factor as a tool to alleviate the tensions in the society, when necessary. The 
realization of this policy was seen during the period of korenizatsiia and in the 
following developments. Within the context of this understanding, in later stages, 
nationalism was condemned in the USSR on the grounds that it could hinder the 
realization of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet power aimed at eliminating the 
bourgeois elements from all the political cadres. This approach resulted in the purges 
of 1930s throughout the Union.
283
 
 
For the Bolsheviks, subversion, the remnants of the elite class of 
prerevolutionary times and the supporters of dissolved political parties represented 
the greatest threats for the State. Fearing that they would claim power in the 
authority, most of the Trotskyites and other “deviationists” of the 1920s were seen as 
dangerous adversaries.
284
 Since the other treacherous elements were eliminated by 
the mass terror of collectivization and dekulakization, the terror now had a new 
direction: the Party itself.
285
  
 
This approach finally resulted in the campaign of the Great Terror (1936-
1938). In parallel with the aforementioned problems of the era, the Great Terror has 
its roots in the past; specifically the evolution of the Soviet society and the 
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Communist Party. Therefore, “the development of the Party, the consolidation of the 
dictatorship, the movements of the faction, the rise of individuals, and the emergence 
of extreme economic policies” were the primary determinants of the era of Great 
Terror.
286
 The Great Terror can simply be identified as a process of the enforcement 
of violent change upon the Soviet society and the Party itself by eliminating the old 
cadres of the Party. 
 
The first practices of the Great Terror began as early as 1935. Although some 
of the “deviationists” remained in the Party until 1937, most of them were expelled 
between 1935 and 1936. After the Kirov murder of 1934, Kirov’s asserted 
“murderers” were deported to Siberia in 1935. Between 1935 and 1936, the 
supporters of Trotsky and Zinoviev were arrested.
287
 Then, with the show trial in 
August 1936 where the “deviationist” leaders Kamenev and Zinoviev stood before 
trial for their terrorist aims, the Great Terror made a ferocious start. This trial 
triggered a campaign which targeted not only the “deviationists”, but also the 
“oppositionists” and the Party members who were not favored by the Bolsheviks for 
their attitudes or criticisms of the Party.
288
 Most of them were executed.  
 
In the period of Great Terror, approximately 100.000 Communist Party 
members were arrested, sent to camps, tortured to confess apocryphal crimes and in 
most cases, they were shot to death. This great number was a result of the efforts of 
“dedicated” Party officials. Although these officials were also purged later, in the 
process they continuously sought for new arrests and shootings in order to show their 
“dedication” to the Party.  
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Moreover, the regime particularly targeted some diaspora nationalities.
289
 
They were subjected to mass arrests and executions on the basis of their ethnic 
identity. The executions of these diaspora nationalities, as ‘national operations’,290 
constitutes almost half of the 700.000 executions during the era of Great Terror. In 
fact, diaspora nationalities were specifically targeted by the Soviet power towards the 
end of the era.
291
 
 
At the end of the era, about 700.000 people were killed and about 600.000 
people were deported to Siberia.
292
 However, in the end, the Great Terror did not 
solve the problems that the regime has been suffering from. What was even worse 
was that the losses in the Party, the state agencies, and the army caused more 
problems in terms of the functioning of the state. In the final analysis, the Great 
Terror demonstrated how such an indiscriminate and violent campaign can be used 
as a policy instrument in the social engineering projects of the Soviet Union. At this 
point, it is worth to bear in mind that the non-Russian regions and nationalities of the 
Union were more harshly affected by the Great Terror in accordance with the 
principles of the nationalities policy. 
 
The history of the purges in Transcaucasia began with the appointment of 
Beria (1899-1953), firstly as the head of the Georgian OGPU (Obyedinyonnoye 
gosudarstvennoye politicheskoye upravleniye- Joint State Political Directorate under 
the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR) in 1926, secondly as the First 
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Secretary of the Communist Party in Georgia in 1931, and finally, as the First 
Secretary of the Transcaucasian Communist Party in 1932. During these years, Beria, 
as the aide of Stalin, enforced the Soviet domination over the Transcaucasian 
nationalities and practiced the purges in the region on small scale. However, after the 
Kirov murder of 1934, Beria operated the purges in Transcaucasia in full force.  
 
For Transcaucasus, the alarm bells rang for the initiation of the “Great 
Terror” when Beria wrote an article named “Turn the Enemies of Socialism to Dust” 
which was published on August 21, 1936, in all the central newspapers.
293
 From this 
date, several public trials, being not public actually, were held in the region, and 
party officials were executed for several alleged crimes.
294
 Specifically in Georgia 
and Azerbaijan, the terror between the years 1937 and 1938 was worse than of the 
other non-Russian republics, with the exception of Ukraine.
295
 In Georgia, for 
example, 425 out of 644 members of the Party Congress were arrested and executed 
in only 1937.
296
 
 
In Georgia, the most important trial took place between July 10 and 12, 1937. 
The former enemies of Stalin, initially Mdivani as the former Premier of Soviet 
Georgia and Okudzhava as an Old Bolshevik, were accused of several crimes. The 
campaign against Mdivani was actually a part of the larger campaign against the old 
party elite including names such as Kavtaradze, Kiknadze, Chikhladze, and Eliava.
297
  
Indeed, Mdivani had been blamed for being a Trotskyite in 1929, and then he was 
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involved in the Party again. At the Zinoviev (1936) and Piatakov (1937) Trials, he 
was accused of being a terrorist and planning terrorist acts against Yezhov and Beria 
respectively.
298
 He and the others, including Okudzhava, were blamed for “terrorism, 
espionage, and links with émigré Georgian Mensheviks”,299 were sentenced to death 
by the Georgian Supreme Court, and executed. 
 
At the beginning of September, 1937, a new group of Georgian and 
Transcaucasian Communists were arrested. Thousands of party members and leaders 
in government were decimated in this wave.
300
 During 1937 and 1938 the whole 
leading cadre in the Georgian Communist Party was destroyed. In his secret report to 
Stalin on October 30, 1937, Beria stated that in 1937 more than 12,000 people were 
arrested, of which 7,374 were convicted at the end of October 1937 in Georgia.
301
 At 
the end of the era, a totally new generation was appointed to the leading posts in the 
Party and the State.
302
 
 
In Azerbaijan, the first strong wave of purges began in the autumn of 1936. 
The former oppositionists within the Bolshevik Party, people suspected of disloyalty 
to the Stalinist leadership and the former members of the non-Bolshevik parties were 
arrested in the first place. Also, “insurgent” groups among the peasantry were also 
identified. The darkest phase of the purges in Azerbaijan began in 1937 and 
continued till the fall of 1938.
 303
 This purge of 1937-1938 eliminated most of the top 
officials including Musabekov, former chairman of the Council of People’s 
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Commissars of Transcaucasia, and Hüseyin Rahmanov, chairman of the Council of 
People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan and the secretary of the Central Committee.304 
During this period in Azerbaijan, 2,792 people were executed, including 22 People’s 
Commissars, 49 secretaries of district committees, 29 chairmen of district executive 
committees, and 4,435 people were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. 
Although the repressions slowed down in 1938, still around 1,100 people were shot 
to death.
 305
 
 
At the zenith of the Great Terror era, between the years 1936 and 1937, the 
ranks of Armenian Communist Party leaders and intellectuals were annihilated by 
Beria.
306
 The purges in Armenia were initiated in May 1937 in full force. Former 
Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, Ter-Gabrielian was the first to be 
interrogated and shot to death. After the meeting of the Armenian Central Committee 
on September 15, 1937, Malenkov was appointed to carry out the operations. It was 
planned that the Armenian leadership would be blamed for the death of Khandzhyan. 
The First Secretary Amatouni, the Second Secretary, the Chairman of the Council of 
People’s Commissars, the President of the Republic and the head of NKVD (Peoples 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs- Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del) were 
arrested and interrogated by Malenkov. At the end of the September 1937, in order to 
identify the enemies, mass arrests among various social strata, especially political 
figures and intellectuals were carried out in the Republic.
307
 Almost the entire elected 
members of the Central Committee were expelled from the Party and arrested. Apart 
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from the leaders, substantial amount of Party, Soviet, economic and military officials 
were arrested, many of whom were shot without trials.
308
 During the Great Terror, 
8,837 people became victims in Armenia, including the intellectuals, scientists, 
priests, and poets. Out of the 4,639 people who were executed, the large majority, 
4,530 people were shot between 1937 and 1938.
309
 
 
Under the Stalinist regime, Transcaucasus was strictly controlled in order to 
hinder any revival of national identity among its political cadres and intelligentsia. In 
this context, purges were strictly conducted in the Republics. During the purges, with 
respect to the total population of the region, substantial number of people, around 
50.000, were arrested, exiled and executed in Transcaucasus.
310
 The old cadres of the 
Party were totally destroyed and new cadres were created. Stalin formed his own 
cadres and in some cases, appointed them to high ranks in Moscow. 
 
 
4.3.4 Transcaucasus during the Second World War 
 
 
 Although the footsteps of the Second World War were first heard in the 
1920s, the war started when Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. France 
and Britain went into the war two days later. On June 10, Italy declared war on 
Britain and only ten days later, on 21 June, France was defeated by Germany and 
surrendered. A year later, Germany attacked the USSR on June 22, 1941. By 1943, 
retreats came: Italy surrendered to an Anglo-American invasion on September 3, 
1943; Germany to the Anglo-American forces on May 7, 1945, and to the Red Army 
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the following day; and Japan to the Americans on September 7, 1945.
311
 By the 
surrender of Japan, Second World War terminated. 
 
 During the 1920s, Stalin was well aware of the forthcoming new threats from 
expansionist Germany and Japan. Therefore, he had already aimed at modernizing 
the Soviet military industry and consolidating an anti-fascist collective security pact 
in Europe in 1930s. However, he failed in his latter aim. Contrarily, he signed the 
Molotov–Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of 1939 with Germany in order to gain 
space and time for the USSR, since he thought of the war as inevitable.
312
 This pact 
contained a Secret Additional Protocol on “the delimitation of their respective 
spheres of interest in Eastern Europe”313 which envisages that Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Bessarabia would be in the Soviet sphere while Lithuania and Vilno 
would stay in the German sphere.
314
 The protocol also secretly divided Poland 
between Germany and the USSR. From this time on, the USSR shifted its strategy 
from a defensive policy to offensive military expansion.
315
 The Red Army invaded 
Poland on September 17, 1939.
316
 Accordingly, in the period until the German attack 
on the USSR, Stalin sold war materials to Germany, annexed the Baltic States and 
the northern part of Romania, attacked Finland and expanded war preparations.
317
 
 
 While Stalin was engaged in the Sovietization of the new acquisitions from 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Hitler was preparing for the attack on the USSR that 
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he had been looking forward to, for both ideological and strategic reasons. On 
December 18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive 21, Barbarossa Plan, for the invasion of 
the Soviet Union.
318
 According to the plan, strategic objective of Operation 
Barbarossa was to defeat the USSR in a short time before finishing the war against 
Britain by splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army which was 
concentrated in the western part of the USSR and destroying them. It was planned 
that the German army would reach to the line of Arkhangelsk - Volga – Astrakhan, 
and particular importance was attached to the capture of Moscow. Although the 
original date appointed for the attack was May 1941, the attack was postponed to 
June 22 due to the German operations in Yugoslavia and Greece.
319
  
 
 Operation Barbarossa,
320
 the most massive military confrontation between the 
USSR and Germany in history,
321
 was initiated on June 22, 1941. Hitler ordered the 
destruction of the Red Army and the acquisition of the Soviet territory in Europe. 
German forces occupied the Baltic region, Belorussia, Ukraine, and sizable territory 
in Russia. By the end of September, having advanced more than a thousand 
kilometers on nearly a thousand kilometers-wide front, the German forces captured 
Kiev, blockaded Leningrad and approached Moscow.
322
 Despite their successes, 
German forces were compelled to retreat in the Battle of Stalingrad by the start of 
1943. The last strategic offensive of Hitler also failed in Kursk in the summer of 
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1943. Still, the complete retreat of the German forces from the Soviet territory was 
carried out in eighteen more months.
323
  
 
 Transcaucasus was of utmost importance for the course of the war. The 
region was significant for its large oil and gas resources in Azerbaijan, which 
supplied almost all the petrol and diesel of the USSR.
324
 The strategic importance of 
Azerbaijan for Hitler’s Germany came to the fore during the war for two reasons: 
first, Hitler was planning to control the supplies of the Allies from the Persian Gulf. 
Second, Azerbaijan was a significant fuel source for Germany.
325
 The region was 
also important for the invasion of the Middle East, which necessitates the 
neutralization of the Soviet forces in the Black Sea and the Caspian. Therefore, 
Transcaucasus became one of the primary aims of Germany in 1942. In turn, Hitler 
planned a three-stage attack under the name of Edelweiss Plan, “moving from 
northwest to southeast, to secure control of the Don River, the mountain passes of the 
Caucasus, and such major ports as Novorossiisk, Poti, Batumi, and eventually the 
oilfields of Baku.”326  
 
 According to the plan, in detail, Generalfeldmarschall
327
 Wilhelm List's 
Army Group A would encompass and demolish the Soviet formations that retreated 
across the Don to the northern Caucasus, occupy the entire Black Sea coastline, 
including Soviet naval bases, which would annihilate the Red Fleet. Simultaneously, 
mountain and light infantry divisions would capture the high ground around Maikop 
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and Armavir and close the passes of the western Caucasus. Eventually, a mobile 
force would close the military road between Ossetia and Grozny, and reach to Baku 
via the Caspian.
328
  
 
 The Battle of the Caucasus, between the German Army Group A and Soviet 
North Caucasian and Transcaucasian front, started on July 25, 1942 when German 
forces crossed the lower Don. Then, the German troops advanced rapidly through the 
Don and Kuban steppes, captured Stavropol, Krasnodar, Maikop, Cherkessk, Nalchik 
and Mozdok. By the end of the August 1942, North Caucasian front was defeated. 
Despite this defeat, the Transcaucasian front succeeded in its defense along the main 
Caucasus range and the Terek River, and blocked the way to the mountain passes 
into the South Caucasus. As a result, apart from a small German invasion in 
Abkhazia, there was not any military activity in the South Caucasus and Dagestan.
 329
 
 
 The Red Army commenced efficient counter-attacks in December 1942 and 
January 1943 and encircled the German forces which incurred losses.
330
 Also, 
German concentration on the Battle of Stalingrad hindered the German advance 
towards Baku.
331
 Having lost the Battle for Stalingrad on February 2, 1943, Army 
Group A started to retreat from the Caucasus and excluding some of the Black Sea 
coast, the Caucasus became free of German occupation on April 22, 1943. The Battle 
came to an end on October 9, 1943 by the withdrawal of the last German troops from 
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the Taman peninsula.
332
 By then, Soviet forces recaptured the occupied ports, 
mountain passes and lands from where the German forces retreated.
333
 
 
 Before the war ended, Soviet officials initiated a cruel campaign of 
deportations
334
 and ethnic cleansing against the minorities of the Caucasus region on 
the grounds that they had collaborated with the Germans.
335
 During the course of the 
war, the first deportees in the Caucasus were the Volga Germans. They were 
deported between September 1941 and January 1942 to special settlements dispersed 
in Soviet Asia. In May 1942, the Greeks living in the Transcaucasian Republics were 
deported to Kazakhstan. Then, the NKVD conducted en masse deportations of; 
Karachays and Kalmyks in 1943, and Chechens, Ingushs, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, 
Crimean Greeks, Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Hemshinids
336
 to Kazakhstan and 
Central Asia in 1944.
337
 
 
Among the other groups, the reason behind the deportation of the Kurds, 
Hemshinids and Meskhetian Turks was different. These peoples, specifically 
Meskhetian Turks, were counted as the potential allies of Turkey in the possibility of 
a war with Turkey.
338
 Therefore, 85,000 Meskhetian Turks, 8,700 Kurds and 1,400 
Hemshinids
339
 living in Georgia were deported together to the special settlements in 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizia in November 1944. The decree ordering the 
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deportation of these nations did not accuse them with collaboration with the Germans 
or espionage unlike the others; they were seen as potential threats and deported in 
order to improve the security of the borders of the Georgian SSR and the USSR.
340
 
 
According to the numbers that N. Bugai gave, 749,613 Germans; 69,267 
Karachays; 93,139 Kalmyks; 387,229 Chechens; 91,250 Ingushs; 44,415 Balkars-
Kabardinians; 183,155 Crimean Tatars
341
; 12,422 Crimean Bulgarians, 9,621 
Armenians and 15,040 Greeks; 91,095 Meskhetian Turks, Kurds and Hemshinids 
were deported in the USSR between 1941 and 1944.
342
 
 
The Great Patriotic War between the USSR and Nazi Germany lasted almost 
four years from the initiation of Operation Barbarossa (June 22, 1941) to the fall of 
Berlin (May 9, 1945). It is estimated that nearly 26 million Soviet citizens,
343
 of 
whom 20 million were men, died during the war.
344
 While the war devastated the 
USSR economically, it contributed to the strengthening of the Stalinist regime. The 
victory over Nazism provided support for the Soviet system which was nourished by 
the apotheosis of Russian motherland, patriotism, and national traditions.
345
 Stalin 
left his discourse of “a union of equal nations” and attributed a leadership to the 
Russian people of whom he propagandized superiority over all other peoples of the 
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USSR.
346
 This approach marked the beginning of a new era of repression for the 
three major Transcaucasian nationalities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 The three titular nations of Transcaucasus witnessed significant changes since 
they came under the rule of the Russian Empire. During the period under the Russian 
rule, social, economic, and political developments took place within the region. First 
of all, with the development projects of the Tsarist Russia, the region was 
industrialized and modernized. On the other hand, the Russification attempts of the 
empire created a sense of national awakening among the three major Transcaucasian 
nationalities and contributed to the formation of local intellectual elites and national 
movements which would maintain themselves in the Soviet and post-Soviet eras.  
 
 On the social strata, discriminatory practices of the Russian power towards 
the Transcaucasian nationalities laid the foundations of ethnic antagonisms, which 
would later be strengthened by the Soviet power. The dissimilarities in the economic 
statuses and political views of the titular nationalities of the region eternalized the 
barriers of their cultures, religions and languages. These differences became more 
evident during and after the First World War and resulted in temporary 
administrative unifications and separations. The titular nationalities of Transcaucasus 
86 
 
ran through a sovereign era from the fall of the Russian Empire to the Bolshevik 
takeover of the region. In this era, they had the chance to practice their own political 
programs which differentiated from each other since they had experienced different 
courses of development in the preceding decades. 
 
 Despite these developments, the tremendous change of the Transcaucasian 
nations coincided with the establishment of the Soviet power on the region. The 
Soviet state dictated the economic, political and military union of the independent 
republics of Transcaucasus at first. However, the formation of the short-lived 
Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, in line with this aim, once more 
manifested the huge economic, social and political differences between the three 
major nationalities. In fact, the dilemma of the Soviet power was the difficulty of 
dealing with a border region of which major nationalities were engaged in hostilities 
towards each other, along with the minority nationalities. During the process of 
Soviet state building, Transcaucasia was re-shaped in every respect. Specifically, it 
would not be an overstatement to assert that Stalin’s nationalities policy completely 
transformed the region, and more than that, it shaped the future of Transcaucasus. 
 
 First and most of all, with the delimitation of borders and the creation of 
autonomous republics and oblasts, and then, with korenizatsiia, New Economic 
Policy, collectivization and purges, the Soviet nationalities policy was exercised over 
the Transcaucasian nationalities. Obviously, these practices had bitter results. 
Considering that the Soviet nationalities policy was based on the use of nationality 
factor as a tool to prevent any nationalist demand in a multinational state, it can be 
87 
 
claimed that their distinctive nationalities became both a blessing and a curse at the 
same time for the Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians. 
 
 By means of delimitation of borders, an ethnic mosaic of Union republics, 
autonomous republics, autonomous regions and non-territorial national autonomies 
came into being. With the re-drawing of the map of the region, ethnically different 
peoples were compelled to live together, in a way ignoring their religious and/or 
linguistic differences, while in other cases the peoples belonging to the same ethnic 
group were separated from each other. This policy would show its impacts in the 
shape of intense conflicts after the 1980s, especially after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union.  
 
 On the other hand, under the policy of korenizatsiia, local national cadres of 
the titular nationalities of Transcaucasus were integrated into the Soviet institutions 
such as the labor unions and the party organs and went through an experience of 
quasi-nation state in the 1920s. Nevertheless, this process stayed ephemeral. During 
the 1930s, Stalin aimed at creating a multinational, Russian speaking Soviet state. 
Therefore, more authoritarian and unitary approaches prevailed on the Bolshevik 
ideals of self-determination. On the social and economic level, a reform process 
including the industrialization and collectivization resulted in a more centralized 
administration in Transcaucasus, which, in time, imposed uniform cultural and 
educational policies as well. Finally, the purges in the era of “Great Terror” 
destroyed the old local Transcaucasian political cadres, elites and intellectuals and 
irreversibly affected the collective political and social memory of the Georgians, 
Azerbaijanis and Armenians.  
88 
 
 It should be kept in mind that the Great Patriotic War also contributed to the 
transformation of the Transcaucasian nationalities. The Soviet victory over Nazism 
strengthened the Soviet system which started to affiliate itself with the Russian 
values. The Bolshevik discourse of “a union of equal nations” was abandoned and 
the superiority of Russian people over all other peoples of the USSR was 
propagandized, which marked the beginning of a new era of repression for the three 
major Transcaucasian nationalities. 
 
 All in all, Soviet nationalities policy in Transcaucasus gave concessions to the 
nationalities on the one hand, and centralized the authority while assimilating the 
ethnic groups on the other. Still, the republics were developed economically; they 
were industrialized and urbanized. Apart from that, the rate of literacy and education 
increased proving that the Soviet system transformed the Transcaucasian republics 
from rural societies to industrialized, educated urban societies despite the system’s 
problematic aspects. Most importantly, due to the Soviet assimilation policies, 
Transcaucasian nationalities acquired an increased awareness of themselves as 
national entities. 
 
 Among all these developments, the administrative arrangements in the region 
hold a significant position. Although the arrangements were carried out in order to 
eliminate any nationalist demands, the distorted ethnic balance created an adverse 
effect. The inter-ethnic discords resulted in increasing nationalist and separatist 
tendencies and clashes between the minority and titular nationalities of the region, 
and eventually turned the region into an area of frozen conflicts. 
  
89 
 
 The long-lasting results of the territorial arrangements of the 1920s and the 
1930s in Transcaucasus resurrected in 1980s and 1990s. By the 1980s, the tension 
between the South Ossetians and the Georgians, had already mounted. During the 
Gorbachev period the Ossetians renewed their demands for the unification of the two 
autonomous republics of the Ossetians into a single entity,
347
 and on the eve of the 
dissolution of the USSR, South Ossetians started to express their aim of separation 
from Georgia. In September 1990, South Ossetia declared its independence. Upon 
the declaration, in January 1991, Georgian forces entered into South Ossetia and 
fightings took place during 1991 and 1992 between the South Ossetians and the 
Georgians. Despite the ceasefire which was signed in June 1992, there were several 
clashes until 1995. Further accords were signed in 1996, but the political situation 
remained unresolved. South Ossetians recapitulated their demands for independence 
under the rule of Saakashvili. Escalating tensions resulted in the Georgian invasion 
of the region in August 2008. 
  
 In Abkhazia, protests were erupted against Georgia in 1957, 1964, 1967 and 
1978.
348
 In 1988 and 1989, the Abkhaz renewed their claims for independence and 
secession from Georgia, which resulted in a boosted feeling of nationalism among 
the Georgians. The protests in Tbilisi in April 1989 were suppressed by the Soviet 
troops. The tension increasingly intensified from then on.
349
 In April 1991, Abkhazia 
declared its independence, and the Georgian troops interfered in Abkhazia in an aim 
to restore the order in August 1992. Despite the cease-fires, negotiations, and UN 
proposals, the conflict continued. The clashes broke out in 1998, 2001 and 2004 
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again, and revived during the August 2008 War. As an internationally unrecognized 
state, Abkhazia stayed also as a region of frozen conflict. 
 
 As in the cases of the South Ossetians and Abkhazians, the Adjars voiced 
their demand on keeping their autonomous status in 1989. However, when 
Gamsakhurdia came to power in Georgia in 1991, he sought for the termination of 
Adjaras’s autonomous status. Protests for the preservation of autonomy emerged in 
Adjara in April 1991. The efforts of the Adjars to keep their autonomous status 
succeeded under Aslan Abashidze’s rule (1991-2004).   Moreover, in comparison 
with the other autonomous oblasts and autonomous republics of Transcaucasus, 
Adjara has escaped from the post-Soviet chaos in the region to some extent.
350
 
Nevertheless, in 2004, Georgia mobilized its forces in the region in order to redeem 
its authority over the region, and toppled Abashidze’s rule. 
  
 Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was also severely 
suffered from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Armenian assaults, sometimes 
in the form of embargos in the late 1980s. Today, Nakhichevan still maintains its 
internationally recognized autonomy as a part of Azerbaijan,
351
 and it has established 
close relations with Turkey since 1990s. 
 
 In de-Stalinization era, nationalist protests emerged among the Armenians 
demanding the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh region into the Armenian SSR and 
these protests were transformed to a bloody war between the Armenians and the 
Azerbaijanis during the glasnost era. From this time on, the region became a major 
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issue for Transcaucasus,
352
 and since 1988, when the dispute turned into an inter-
ethnic violence, the temperature of the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh was hardly below the boiling point.
353
 
 
 By the end of 1993, Armenians took the control of most of the region along 
with the neighboring parts of Azerbaijan to the west and south. Despite the unofficial 
cease-fire in 1994 through Russian mediation, there have been still small clashes 
since 1994.
354
 The negotiations conducted by the Minsk Group of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe also did not succeed to resolve the problem 
on the status of the region.
355
 Therefore, a final political resolution to the situation 
has not been concluded, which turned the problem into a frozen conflict destabilizing 
Transcaucasus,
356
 and the region is currently a de facto part of Armenia. 
  
 All the above-mentioned developments evidently demonstrate that the 
nationalities policy, especially in the form of territorial re-setting in the region 
contributed much to the contemporarily volatile situation of Transcaucasus.  
  
 Consequently, this thesis attempts to shed light on the evolution of 
Transcaucasian nationalities under the Soviet rule. Approximately 25 years of Soviet 
rule until 1945 presented both benefits and drawbacks for these nationalities. It is 
undeniable that the region witnessed remarkable modernization and development. 
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Furthermore, the Soviet rule contributed to the national awareness and political 
culture of Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians, which each of the nationalities 
have sustained within their independent states after the breakup of the USSR.  
However, on the other hand, the distrust originating from the assimilation practices, 
purges, forced modernization and the problematic administrative-territorial 
composition created by the nationalities policy generated a precarious and fragile 
setting in the region. 
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